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Introduction
This dissertation focuses on various economic problems of central European
countries in transition. Membership in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) and an inflow of foreign capital belong to the biggest challenges these
countries have to face.
The first essay therefore focuses on exchange-rate stability in five new
members of the European Union (EU). This stability is not only a criterion
for joining the EMU but also a fundamental property of stable economic de-
velopment. However, there are several factors that could slow or interrupt
these countries’ EMU-integration process. For this reason, this essay analyzes
key factors contributing to euro exchange-rate volatility in the new EU mem-
bers during the period 1999-2004: economic openness, the “news” factor, and
the exchange-rate regime. A TARCH (threshold autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity) model is employed to model the volatility of exchange
rates. Although this essay focuses on each country separately, in general the
results suggest that economic openness has a calming effect on exchange-rate
volatility, news significantly affects volatility, and flexible regimes experience
higher degrees of volatility. The extent of all these effects varies substantially
across countries, however.
The remaining of this dissertation is then devoted to various impacts of
foreign direct investment (FDI) on domestic companies in the Czech Repub-
lic. Particularly, the second essay analyzes their sales growth rates. Using
firm-level panel data from 1995 to 2003, it studies both horizontal and ver-
tical spillovers. I pay attention to the potential endogeneity of FDI with
respect to future industry growth. The results suggest that domestic compa-
nies are mostly suffering from the presence of foreign companies, especially
in upstream sectors.
The third essay is coauthored with Sˇteˇpa´n Jurajda and we ask there the
1
following questions. Does foreign ownership improve corporate performance
or do foreign firms merely select more productive targets for takeover? Do
workers benefit from foreign acquisitions? We answer these questions based
on comparing the before/after change in several performance indicators of
Czech firms subject to foreign takeover after 1997, i.e., after the initial waves
of privatization were completed, with the corresponding performance change
of matched companies that remain domestically owned until 2005. We find
that the impact of foreign investors on domestic acquisitions is significantly
positive only in non-exporting manufacturing industries, while it is small
in both services and manufacturing industries competing on international
markets.
2
Chapter 1
Determinants of Exchange Rate
Volatility: The Case of the
New EU Members
Finance a u´veˇr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance
(2007, vol. 57, no. 9-10)
1.1 Introduction
One of the reasons for establishing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
was to promote exchange rate stability among member countries and to en-
courage trade inside the European Union (EU). Otherwise, exchange rate
instability could have a negative impact on investment and trade. In the
case of sudden movements of an exchange rate, domestic risk-averse compa-
nies could turn their focus on the domestic market rather than on the foreign
one because the amount of their revenue would become unclear (Dell’Ariccia,
1999). In fact, this exactly opposes the aim of the EU.
As a result of EU enlargement, ten new countries joined the EU in May
2004. The process of their accession further continues as they prepare to
join the EMU probably around 2009-2012. By that time, these countries
will have to fulfill the Maastricht criteria. This research focuses on factors
that can jeopardize the process of fulfilling the second of these criteria - the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) criterion which defines the exchange rate
3
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of the participating currency against the euro. The currency can fluctuate
around the central rate by ±15%.
Thus, the goal of this paper is to analyze the sources of euro exchange
rate volatility for five central and eastern European countries (CEEC-5) that
acceded to the EU in May 20041. As possible sources, I am interested in the
openness of an economy, the “news” factor, and the exchange rate regime due
to their undisputed contribution to exchange rate movements. Since these
countries are trying to fulfill exacting criteria imposed by the EU, including
stable exchange rates, it is necessary and beneficial to know the source of
their possible failure.2
Although there are already several studies dealing with the volatility of
exchange rates in transition countries (Kocˇenda, 1998; Orlowski, 2003; Ko´bor
and Sze´kely, 2004; Bul´ıˇr, 2005; Kocˇenda and Valachy, 2006), the contribution
of this study over the previous projects lies in investigating not only the
volatility itself but also its determinants and their casual effects. Moreover,
I employ the TARCH model for modeling the volatility of exchange rates
because it allows for an asymmetric, i.e., more realistic, impact of news on
exchange rate volatility.
In general, the results are consistent with natural expectations. They
suggest that the openness has a lowering effect on exchange rate volatility in
the case of Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Furthermore, a less tight regime
corresponds to higher volatility in the case of Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.
A significant effect of news on exchange rate volatility is found in all cases.
However, the extent of all these effects varies substantially across countries.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 deals with previous stud-
ies relevant for this research. The methodology is explained in Section 1.3.
Section 1.4 comprises data description and Section 1.5 presents the empirical
results. The last section concludes.
1These are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I do not
include Malta and Cyprus here since these two countries are not in the process of transition
and they are considered to be functioning market economies. Moreover, Estonian kroon,
Latvian lats, and Lithuanian litas are firmly linked to the euro, and therefore, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania are not included in this research either.
2Although Slovenia has been a member of the EMU since January 1, 2007, it is included
in this research for the sake of consistency.
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1.2 Literature Review
There is a variety of factors contributing to the fluctuation of an exchange
rate, e.g., the openness of an economy, the domestic and foreign money sup-
plies, the exchange rate regime, interest rates, central bank independence,
levels of output, income, inflation, and unpredictable circumstances. The de-
gree of the impact of each of these factors varies and depends on a particular
country’s economic condition. However, the countries that are in the process
of transition (CEEC-5 group) are more vulnerable to being affected by these
factors. Although this paper analyzes just a few of these factors, according
to the empirical literature mentioned below they should be the ones with the
biggest impact. In the following section, I explain my incentives for choosing
particular factors as well as their validity.
1.2.1 Openness of an Economy
As was discussed above, one of the reasons for establishing the EMU was to
promote the greater openness of economies and higher exchange rate stability
among EU countries. However, you cannot achieve one without achieving the
other. Thus, it is likely that there is a close link between these two factors.
One of the studies dealing with these factors was elaborated by Hau
(2002). In particular, the author analyzes the openness of an economy and
its impact on real exchange rate movements. He claims that trade integration
and real exchange rate volatility are structurally linked and that there is a
negative correlation between them. As support, he uses a small open economy
model with a tradable and a non-tradable sector. The solution of this model
indicates that economies which are more open have a more flexible aggregate
price level. This flexibility reduces the effect of unanticipated money supply
shocks. It further results in lower real exchange rate volatility for countries
with greater openness of the economy. Hau further supports his claim with
empirical research with a sample of 48 countries over a 19-year time period.
As a proxy for openness he uses an import vs. GDP ratio. Real exchange rate
volatility is measured as the standard deviation for the percentage changes of
the effective real exchange rate over intervals of 36 months. The results con-
firm the impact of an economy’s openness on exchange rate volatility when
openness explains almost half of exchange rate variations. However, Hau’s
5
Chapter 1: Determinants of Exchange Rate Volatility
results do not say anything about particular countries because each country
is represented only by arithmetic mean values over the whole period.
1.2.2 Unpredictable Circumstances
The next factor analyzed in this paper concerns unpredictable circumstances
or news. This affects all real variables as well as asset yields. In stock mar-
kets simple information, often not even valid, might cause huge movements
of stock prices. The behavior of exchange rates is very similar, and the con-
sequences of events like government crises, market crises, industrial shocks
and terrorist attacks are undisputed. The role of news as the predominant
cause of exchange rate movements has already been emphasized in studies
by Dornbusch (1978) and Frenkel (1981).
The latter one, by Frenkel, studies the volatility of the US exchange rates
between GBP, FFR and DEM.3 The first part of his paper concerns exchange
rate movements and their predictability where he claims that the predicted
changes in exchange rates capture only a small fraction of actual changes.
Therefore, since most changes in exchange rates are unanticipated, most of
them happen due to some new information. Frenkel supports this with an
eight-year period of monthly data of the US/GBP, US/FFR, and US/DEM
exchange rate movements. In the second part of his study, Frenkel, seeking
a suitable instrumental variable for modeling news, discusses the relation-
ship between exchange and interest rates. Although macroeconomic theory
explains the negative impact of interest rates on exchange rates via capi-
tal/current accounts, he claims – based on empirical results from US data –
that it does not hold in an inflationary environment, and the impact is actu-
ally positive.4 Furthermore, in line with the rational expectations hypothesis
indicating the predominant role of news in affecting real variables and Dorn-
busch (1978), who decomposes the news effects into “those which alter the
expected future spot rate between the last period and the present, and those
which lead to a reassessment of the one-period interest rate differential,”5
Frenkel proposes a model for estimating the effect of news on exchange rate
3GBP = Great Britain Pound, FFR = French Franc, DEM = Deutsche Mark
4However, based on the empirical results from Frenkel’s study, the macroeconomic
theory holds in this case because the effect is negative for all three exchange rates, although
it does not differ significantly from zero.
5Frenkel (1981), pp. 686.
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variability:
lnSt = a+ b lnFt−1 + α [(i− i∗)t − Et−1(i− i∗)t] + ωt,
where St is the spot rate, Ft−1 is the lagged forward exchange rate, i is the
interest rate in the domestic currency, i∗ is the interest rate in the foreign
currency, and Et−1(.) represents the interest differential expected at time
t based on information available at time t − 1. The first two components
on the right-hand side represent the expected exchange rate and the term
in brackets represents news. According to Frenkel, applying this regression
on all three pairs of currencies (separately) indicates a positive correlation
between news and exchange rates. However, there is a weakness in these
results. Frenkel uses lnSt as a dependent variable but he does not consider
that this time series is most likely non-stationary. He also does not take into
account asymmetric effects of positive and negative news. Moreover, monthly
data, used by Frenkel, cannot capture the moment of surprise caused by some
new information. Therefore, I expect to obtain better and more significant
results using higher frequency data.
The effect of news is discussed also in a study by Galati and Ho (2003)
who investigate to what extent daily movements in the euro/dollar exchange
rate are driven by news. Finding again a statistically significant correlation
between them, good news results in the appreciation of currency, and vice
versa. For modeling news they use a similar approach to Frenkel – the dif-
ference between the actual and forecasted values – although they measure
it on various macroeconomic indicators.6 The exchange rate movements are
captured by the differences in values of the logarithm of the spot prices.
Additionally, although Galati and Ho focus also on studying asymmetric be-
havior of an exchange rate with respect to good or bad news, they do not find
any significant asymmetry. On the other hand, Engle and Ng (1993) claim
that there is an asymmetric effect of news on volatility and suggest various
modifications of the ARCH model7 for emulating exchange rate volatility.
For example, the EGARCH model allows different impacts of good and bad
news, as well as major and minor news. In the spirit of this asymmetry,
6Change in non-farm payrolls, the unemployment rate, the employment cost index,
durable goods orders, NAPM manufacturing, NAPM non-manufacturing, advance retail
sales, industrial production, the consumer price index, and the producer price index.
7The autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model (ARCH) was introduced by
Engle (1982). Later, this model was generalized (GARCH) by Bollerslev (1986).
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Sanchez-Fung (2003) studies daily returns, volatility, and news in the foreign
exchange market of the Dominican Republic, concluding that impact on the
volatility of exchange rate returns is higher for positive shocks (depreciations)
than for negative ones (appreciations).
1.2.3 Exchange Rate Regime
The last but equally important factor is the exchange rate regime. It is a
well-known fact that nominal exchange rate variability is lower in the case
of fixed exchange rates than for floating ones. For my research, examples of
countries that adopted a floating exchange rate are Slovakia, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, while Slovenia and Hungary prefer variations of a pegged
exchange rate.
1.2.4 Volatility of Exchange Rate
There are further studies concerning exchange rate volatility, although mostly
they investigate the impact of exchange rate volatility rather than sources of
this volatility. However, among other things (such as the subject of study),
they differ in the way of modeling exchange rate volatility. According to this
modeling, they can be divided into two groups – the ones that use various
modifications of standard deviations and the ones that use modifications of
the ARCH approach.
Belke and Setzer (2003) belong to the first group. They study the impact
of exchange rate volatility on the labor market. In their case, the exchange
rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the 12 month-to-
month changes in the logarithm of the spot rate. Dell’Ariccia (1999) studies
the effect of exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade flows. He uses the
standard deviation of the first difference of the logarithmic exchange rate as
well, but he also employs two other measures – the sum of the squares of
the forward errors and the percentage difference between the maximum and
minimum nominal spot rate. Moreover, there are studies, such as Kenen and
Rodrik (1986), Koray and Lastrapes (1989), Chowdhury (1993), Ko´bor and
Sze´kely (2004), and Bul´ıˇr (2005) that model the exchange rate volatility as
the moving sample standard deviation of the growth rate of the real exchange
rate.
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On the other hand, Baum et al. (2004), analyzing the impact of exchange
rate volatility on the volume of bilateral exports, and Choudhry (2005), in-
vestigating the influence of exchange rate volatility on real exports, apply the
GARCH model for measuring volatility. Further modification of the ARCH
approach can be found in Orlowski (2003, 2004). Here, for modeling exchange
rate volatility the TARCH model is employed. Kocˇenda and Valachy (2006),
analyzing recent developments in exchange rate volatility in the Visegrad
Group countries,8 suggest usage of the leverage GARCH model.9 Moreover,
exchange rate volatility and the TARCH model are analyzed also in studies
by Kocˇenda (1998) and McKenzie (2002). Although the TARCH approach is
mostly employed in papers analyzing stock price movements, Kocˇenda (1998)
claims that with regard to risk there is almost no difference between holding
foreign exchange and equity. For this reason, he stresses the justification of
using the TARCH approach also for modeling exchange rate volatility.
Thus, this latter approach – ARCH – is plausible also for this research
because its modification allows for an asymmetric, i.e., more realistic, impact
of news on exchange rate volatility.
1.2.5 Previous Literature about Exchange Rate
Volatility
The issue of the stability of the exchange rate in new EU member countries
preparing for EMU accession is well researched. The following paragraphs
describe some of the most important papers focusing on this topic.
Kocˇenda (1998) studies the exchange rate of the Czech Koruna against
six major currencies. He finds the somewhat surprising result that the Czech
exchange rate is less volatile with a wider fluctuation band. Orlowski (2003)
examines the impact of monetary policies on exchange rate risk premiums
and inflation in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. He concludes that
the governments of these countries succeeded mainly in lowering inflation
rather than exchange rate volatility. Orlowski (2004) then continues in his
research by analyzing the effect of interest rates and inflation on exchange
rate movement, which is defined as the differential of the log of the spot
exchange rate. He claims that the Czech exchange rate is more affected by
8the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
9The leverage GARCH model is in fact the TARCH model.
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inflation expectations, while the opposite is true for Poland, where the impact
of the interest rate differential is more pronounced. Regarding Hungary, its
currency is affected by both of those factors. A further analysis of exchange
rate volatility reveals that in the Czech Republic and Poland it is driven
mainly by the persistency effect. In Hungary it is dominated by asymmetric
shocks. All three of these papers allow for asymmetric effects of shocks on
volatility but only within the TARCH model through a leverage term.
The following three papers are similar in focusing on the same objects
– the Visegrad Group countries. Ko´bor and Sze´kely (2004) study volatility
using a Markov regime-switching model which allows them to identify periods
of highly and lowly volatile exchange rates. Not surprisingly, their results say
that volatility between these periods changes and is lower in lowly volatile
periods. They also claim that there are substantial differences in volatility
among the four countries. Bul´ıˇr (2005) looks at the relationship between
exchange rate volatility and financial market liberalization and concludes
that liberalization significantly contributes to the stability of the exchange
rates in all four countries. Finally, Kocˇenda and Valachy (2006) compare
exchange rate volatility between fixed and floating regimes. Their findings
confirm natural expectations that volatility increases under a less tight, i.e.,
floating, regime. Moreover, they augment the TARCH model by inclusion of
an interest rate differential and its intertemporal change in order to account
for their impact on volatility. They claim asymmetric decreasing effects of
news on exchange rate volatility, as well as contemporaneous impact of the
interest differential.
The previous literature dealing with exchange rate volatility is quite com-
prehensive. Nevertheless, the previous studies concentrate mainly on volatil-
ity itself leaving the question of its determinants unresolved. Although there
are some attempts to solve this problem, they are mostly implicit. Literature
focusing primarily and explicitly on determinants of exchange rate volatility
is still missing.
1.3 Methodology
The paper analyzes the volatility of the exchange rate between the euro and
the domestic currency for five different countries. The crux of this project
10
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lies in properly choosing the way to model the analyzed factors, especially
the openness of an economy and news and, more importantly, to approximate
an otherwise unobservable volatility.
1.3.1 Factors
Starting with independent variables, for modeling the openness of an econ-
omy, I follow Hau (2002) and use a proxy defined as the ratio of quarterly
imports and quarterly gross domestic product. However, in order to observe
the effects of openness on exchange rate volatility caused only by structural
changes in openness and not by business cycles noise, the Hodrick-Prescott
filter10 is applied to quarterly openness time series. Then, since I need a daily
frequency time series, the resulting time series is extended so that it com-
prises only four different values for every year, and the same smooth ratio of
quarterly imports and quarterly GDP is assigned to each day in a particular
quarter.
Since it is difficult to observe and quantify unpredictable circumstances or
news, I build on the specification proposed by Frenkel (1981), who, knowing
the fact that asset markets clear fast and react immediately to news, creates
a new variable
NEWSt = (i− i∗)t − Et−1(i− i∗)t, (1.1)
where i is the interest rate in the home currency and i∗ is the interest rate in
the foreign currency; the first term in this difference denotes the innovation
in the interest differential and the second one denotes the interest differential
which was expected to prevail in period t based on the information avail-
able at t− 1. Partially following Frenkel, the latter term is estimated from
a regression of the interest differential on the constant, two-lagged values of
the differential and the logarithm of the lagged spot exchange rate. Frenkel
is followed only partially because originally he suggests using the forward
exchange rate instead of the spot exchange rate. However, since forward ex-
change rate markets are either not developed sufficiently or do not have a
long history in the CEEC-5 group, the spot rate is used instead. I justify
this modification using Frenkel’s own argumentation when he claims the cor-
10This is a smoothing method used by macroeconomists to obtain a smooth estimate
of the long-term trend component of a series, first used by Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
The penalty parameter is set to 1600 since the filter is applied to quarterly data.
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relation between the forward and spot exchange rate to be more than 0.99 in
the case of his data. This is also the case for CEEC-5 where the correlation
for available periods is more than 0.98 for every country.
For modeling different exchange rate regimes, I create a set of dummy
variables for different regimes.
1.3.2 Measure of Volatility
Regarding the dependent variable, i.e., the volatility of exchange rates, I
employ the threshold autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (TARCH)
model. This model comprises a leverage term that allows for the asymmetric
effects of good and bad news. The general TARCH(p, q) model is specified
as:
rt = a0 +
P∑
i=1
airt−i +
Q∑
i=0
biεt−i; εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2t
)
σ2t = ω +
p∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i +
q∑
i=1
βiσ
2
t−i + ξdt−1ε
2
t−1,
where variable rt is the exchange rate change over two consecutive trading
days, and σ2t is the conditional variance that is a function of not only the
previous realizations of εt, but also the previous conditional variances and
the leverage term. The core of this leverage term is the dummy variable dt−1
that equals 1 in the case of a negative shock (εt−1 ≤ 0) and 0 in the case
of a positive shock (εt−1 > 0). Thus, the positive value of the coefficient ξ
indicates an increased conditional variance by ε2t−1 in the case of negative
shocks or news that occur at time t-1, while the negative value of coeffi-
cient ξ indicates a decreased conditional variance. The additional restriction∑p
i=1 αi +
∑q
i=1 βi < 1 is a sufficient and necessary condition for stability of
the conditional variance.
In order to get a properly specified model and correctly conditioned
volatility, the most appropriate ARMA(P,Q) model of the exchange rate
return is estimated using the Box-Jenkins methodology11. Then the Ljung-
Box Q-test12 is applied to test squared residuals of the ARMA(P,Q) model
for the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity. The next step is to iden-
tify the orders of the TARCH(p, q) process by experimenting with different
11Box and Jenkins (1976)
12Ljung and Box (1978)
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orders p and q; estimating the whole ARMA(P,Q) − TARCH(p, q) model;
checking the significance of the estimated coefficients; and then diagnosing
the standardized residuals. Once the presence of conditional heteroskedastic-
ity is detected and the orders p and q of the TARCH process are chosen, the
whole ARMA(P,Q)−TARCH(p, q) model is estimated using the maximum
likelihood estimation where the log-likelihood function has the form
L = − 1
2T
T∑
t=1
log σ2t + ε
2
t/σ
2
t .
Finally, the standardized residuals are diagnosed by applying the Ljung-
Box Q-test and the LM test for the presence of an ARCH process.13 If the
estimated model is a correct one, then these residuals should be white noise14
and no further GARCH process should be present.
1.3.3 Model for Estimation of the Effects
Having estimated all the necessary variables, I perform the actual analysis of
the impact of various factors by estimating the following model using OLS:
ERVt = α+β
(
Imt
GDPt
)
+γGGt∗NEWSt+γBBt∗NEWSt+δREGIMEt+εt,
(1.2)
where ERVt denotes exchange rate volatility estimated in the previous TARCH
model, Gt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in case of good news (NEWSt < 0),
Bt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in case of bad news (NEWSt > 0) and
REGIMEt denotes a set of dummy variables for exchange rate regimes. This
process is repeated for each of the five countries in order to determine the dif-
ferent impacts on each particular currency. The interpretation of coefficient
β is straightforward, a positive value of β results in increased volatility in the
case of increased openness. Similarly, a positive value of coefficient δ results
in increased volatility in the presence of a particular regime with respect to
a base regime. However, the manner of constructing the NEWSt variable
13Engle (1982)
14The latest literature suggests an even stronger condition. The standardized residuals
should be tested for being iid because there might be hidden nonlinear patterns that are
not detected if a white noise test is applied. For this purpose, one can apply the BDS test
developed by Brock et al. (1987) or, as an alternative, Kocˇenda’s test, which was devised
by Kocˇenda (2001). However, these two tests cannot be applied here, since they require
the standardized residuals to have a normal distribution and the residuals estimated in
this study do not have such a property.
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requires an opposite interpretation – if it is assumed that the interest rate
in the foreign currency does not change due to news in the home country
and good news in the home country leads to a decrease in the home currency
interest rate, then good news results in a negative value of the NEWSt vari-
able. Thus, a negative value of coefficient γ results in increased volatility in
the case of good news.
1.4 Data
All the data used in this project were collected with daily frequency during
the period of January 1, 1999 – December 31, 2004 from several sources –
IMF-IFS, Eurostat, national banks, and central statistical offices. Although
there is another strand of literature that studies intraday volatility15 using
high frequency data with a several-minute-long time interval (Cˇerny´ and
Koblas, 2005), for the purpose of this project it is sufficient to use daily data.
Using lower frequency data, e.g., monthly or quarterly, might result in the
failure of this study because it would often not be able to capture any effects
of news on exchange rate movements.
The extent of openness differs substantially in the CEEC-5 group. While
the value of Polish imports corresponds on average to 31% of GDP, in the
case of Slovenia it is about 50%. The economies of the Czech Republic
and Hungary are on average even more open (61%), but the biggest share of
imports over GDP can be found in Slovakia (almost 70%). Figure 1.1 displays
the openness path in each country before (dotted line) and after (solid line)
smoothing. All patterns exhibit an increasing trend, except Hungary with
its decreasing trend since the fourth quarter of 2001. Basic characteristics
are summarized in Table 1.1.
The factor of news is modeled from a particular country’s interest rates
(IBORs) with maturity of three months,16 the Central European Bank’s in-
terest rates (EURIBOR) with the same maturity, and the spot exchange rates
against the euro.
An overview of adopted official exchange rate regimes in each country can
15Typically concerning stock market indices.
16PRIBOR for the Czech Republic, BUBOR for Hungary, WIBOR for Poland, and
BRIBOR for Slovakia. In the case of Slovenia, interbank money market rates for deposits
up to 30 days are used instead due to the lack of SITIBOR data.
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be found in Table 1.2. Since Slovakia and the Czech Republic did not change
their exchange rate regime during the whole time span, the regime factor is
not analyzed as a source of exchange rate volatility in their case.17
Finally, the basic characteristics of the nominal exchange rates of each
CEEC-5 country’s currency vis-a`-vis the euro are summarized in Table 1.4.
Corresponding exchange rate changes are displayed in Figure 1.2. Looking
at this figure, there is a general trend of decreasing volatility at the end
of the time span. Regarding the connection between volatility and real-life
events, there is a tendency for increased volatility prior to presidential or
parliamentary elections, although this is not always the case. In the case
of Hungary, there is a visible change in the regime in May 2001 with much
higher volatility afterwards. On the other hand, Slovenia has extremely low
volatility, which is the result of a tight exchange rate regime during the whole
time span.
1.5 Empirical Results
The first stage of analyzing the effects of determinants of exchange rate
volatility consists of estimating the corresponding TARCH model for each
currency. The results of these estimations are summarized in Table 1.3. With
the exception of Slovenia, the results suggest that in the CEEC-5 group the
exchange rate volatility is statistically significantly asymmetrically affected
by unpredictable circumstances. The sign of leverage term implies lower con-
ditional variance in the case of a negative shock for Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia, while for the Czech Republic it implies higher conditional variance.
In the case of Slovenia, a simple ARCH model with variance as an ARCH-M
term is estimated instead. For each country the sum of α’s and β’s in the vari-
ance equation satisfies the stability condition, which implies that exchange
17According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), it is necessary to be careful while modeling
different exchange rate regimes and not to blindly follow official classification of these
regimes. For this reason, they study dual and parallel exchange rate markets on a sample
of 153 countries over a 55-year time period. Based on this, they claim that a majority of
official pegs are actually floats, and vice versa. As a result, they provide a new system
for classifying exchange rate regimes with the accent on real and proclaimed regimes.
Fortunately, this is not the case in the CEEC-5 group. These countries either comply with
their proclaimed regimes or the changes are only superficial. Only in the case of Poland is
there a pre-announced crawling band of ±12.5%, later changed to ±15%, while according
to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) it is de facto ±5% in both cases. Therefore, I employ official
exchange rate regimes for the purpose of this study.
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rate changes converge to the steady-state level, although this convergence is
slow in the Czech Republic with sums close to one. Additionally, the value
of coefficient β in the GARCH term close to one suggests that there is a
high persistence of conditional variance in these two countries. Regarding
asymmetric effects and variance persistency, these results are in accordance
with previous studies by Orlowski (2003) and Kocˇenda and Valachy (2006),
although these studies do not deal with Slovenia.
Once the correct ARCH model is specified, conditional variance from
this model is calculated. Moreover, the NEWS variable is estimated from
equation (1.1). Basic characteristics about variance and news are presented in
Tables 1.5 and 1.6, respectively. Both of these variables are further depicted
in Figures 1.3 and 1.4, respectively.
The final stage is to run a regression (1.2). This regression is run with-
out the REGIME variable for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, since these
countries did not change their exchange rate regime during the whole time
span. I also allow for lags of the NEWS variable in this regression in or-
der to capture delayed effects of news. The results of these estimations are
summarized in Table 1.7.
The negative sign of coefficient β corresponds to the previously mentioned
theory that countries with more open economies tend to have lower exchange
rate volatility. The only exception here is Hungary with a positive, but
statistically insignificant, value of β. The effect of openness is insignificant
also in the Czech Republic. On the other hand, openness has statistically
significant effects on exchange rate volatility in the other three countries. The
smallest effect is in Slovakia, where a 1% increase in the ratio of import over
GDP decreases variance by 3.1% of its mean value. Bigger effects are seen
in Poland (8.8%) and in Slovenia with its huge 98% decrease.18 Although
the impact on Slovenia seems to be too dramatic, one has to keep in mind
that openness in Slovenia is the most stable among these five countries and
a 1% increase in the overall trend is quite unlikely. Moreover, these numbers
are provided here only for comparison in order to see the differences between
particular countries – Slovenia is much more affected by its foreign trade than
are the other four countries.
18These results are obtained by comparing the estimated coefficient from Table 1.7 with
the corresponding mean value of estimated conditional variance from Table 1.5.
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The results for regimes reflect natural expectations – a less tight regime
corresponds to higher volatility. In May 2001 Hungary changed its exchange
rate regime from a ±2.25% crawling band to ±15% and the results suggest
that the former regime significantly lowers conditional variance by its mean
value compared to the latter regime. In the case of Poland, a change of the
exchange rate regime from a ±12.5% crawling band to ±15% has no signifi-
cant effects on conditional variance with respect to a base floating exchange
rate regime. Similarly, in Slovenia a change from a ±2% crawling band to
Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) has no significant effects on volatility
either. This implies that Slovenia does not use the whole ±15% band that is
allowed by ERM II.
With regard to the news effects,19 the results are mostly consistent with
the results concerning the leverage effect from the TARCH model. The ex-
ceptions are Poland and Hungary with lagged effects of news. In both cases,
the effects of good news are opposite those estimated by the leverage term
from the TARCH model. The reason for this discrepancy may be that the
TARCH model uses the residuals only from exchange rate changes, while the
approach in equation (1.1) accounts for changes in expectations about ex-
change rates as well as interest rates. However, the complexity of this latter
approach guarantees more accurate measures of the news effects. In all five
countries, the results suggest that news statistically significantly impacts ex-
change rate volatility; there is no statistically significant difference between
good and bad news at the level of the effect, and there are huge differences in
vulnerability across the CEEC-5 group when taking into account the extreme
values of estimated news.20 Good (bad) news increases (decreases) exchange
rate volatility in the Czech Republic (about 30% of its mean) and Poland
(about half the mean). The situation is the opposite in Slovakia, where good
news decreases and bad news increases exchange rate volatility by more than
the mean of its exchange rate volatility. Hungary and Slovenia are the only
countries where any news, good or bad, increases exchange rates volatility,
again by more than the mean of their exchange rate volatility.
19Recall that a negative sign of coefficient γ in the case of good news is interpreted so
that it increases exchange rate volatility.
20The following results are obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients from Table
1.7 with the corresponding extreme values from Table 1.6 (min. for good news and max.
for bad news) and then comparing them with the mean value of estimated conditional
variance from Table 1.5.
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The previous results reveal an interesting fact. While good news con-
tributes to increased volatility in every country except Slovakia, the impact
of bad news is negative or close to zero when positive values are either not
significant or significant only at the 15% level in the case of Hungary, Slo-
vakia, and Slovenia. Nevertheless, although this fact seemingly contradicts
natural expectations, it has a reasonable explanation. Regarding good news
– the exchange rate changes also in this case and even if it declines – this
appreciation contributes to increased volatility. On the other hand, the im-
pact of bad news is suppressed because bad news is usually accompanied by
expectations of active policy responses that hamper any potential movements
in the exchange rate (Orlowski, 2003).
Several further tests are performed to ensure that the previous results
are robust for changes in the methodology of either the dependent or inde-
pendent variable. At first, openness in regression (1.2) is replaced with its
original form, i.e., without the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The results for news
and regimes remain unchanged – the sign as well as significance. Regarding
openness, the results are in general lower in magnitudes (2-10 times), with
the sign and significance unchanged. This is probably caused by higher vari-
ation in unfiltered openness when the overall impact is diminished. This only
supports the application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The second variation
in regression (1.2) is the change in the dependent variable. Now exchange
rate volatility is modeled using a simpler GARCH model so the asymmetric
effects are allowed only by the NEWS variable.21 The results of all variables
are consistent with the baseline specification also in this case. There are only
minor differences in magnitudes of news.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed the sources of euro exchange rate volatility
separately for every country in the CEEC-5 group. As possible sources, I am
interested in the openness of an economy, the news factor, and the exchange
rate regime. Exchange rate volatility is estimated from a TARCH model with
emphasis on the asymmetric effects of news. However, these asymmetric
21This robustness test is not performed for Slovenia since the TARCH model was not
employed in this case.
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effects are confirmed only in the sense of their sign, not their value. This
study further confirms the assumption that more open economies tend to
have lower exchange rate volatility when this result holds in most countries.
Looking at the results for particular countries, news has a large effect on
exchange rate volatility in Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia. But Slovenia has
huge potential in its openness, which has a substantial decreasing impact on
its exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, Hungary and Slovakia cannot
rely on such a tool because openness has almost no effect on their exchange
rate volatility. The other two countries, Poland and the Czech Republic,
cannot rely on openness in decreasing their exchange rate volatility either.
However, these countries’ exchange rate volatility is affected by news only
slightly. Regarding regimes, only key changes in exchange rate regimes have
significant effects on exchange rate volatility, while minor and superficial
changes are not reflected in volatility at all.
Looking at the results for particular countries, there is a large effect of
news on exchange rate volatility in Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia. But
Slovenia has a huge potential in its openness which has a substantial de-
creasing impact on its exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, Hungary
and Slovakia cannot rely on such a tool because the openness has almost no
effect on their exchange rate volatility. The other two countries, Poland and
the Czech Republic, cannot rely on the openness in decreasing their exchange
rate volatility as well. However, these countries’ exchange rate volatility is
affected by news only slightly. Regarding regimes, only key changes in ex-
change rate regimes have significant effects on exchange rate volatility, while
minor and superficial changes are not reflected in volatility at all.
The main contribution of this study is that it sheds some light on a few
potential pitfalls that may occur during the CEEC-5 group’s EMU integra-
tion process. The fact that the vulnerability of these countries varies may be
explained by the different strength of each country’s currency or by different
policies adopted by each country’s central bank. Either way, further research
is needed in order to distinguish between these two cases and to see their
impact on other Maastricht criteria.
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1.8 Appendix
Table 1.1: Openness after smoothing – Data summary.
country min max mean st.dev.
Czech Republic 0.5706 0.6345 0.6153 0.0193
Hungary 0.5687 0.6241 0.6059 0.0155
Poland 0.2882 0.3538 0.3112 0.0207
Slovakia 0.6093 0.7380 0.6903 0.0402
Slovenia 0.4886 0.5229 0.5060 0.0098
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Figure 1.1: Openness in the CEEC-5 group during 1999-2004.
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Source: IMF-IFS; Eurostat; and author’s calculations.
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Figure 1.2: Exchange rate changes in the CEEC-5 group.
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Figure 1.3: Estimated conditional variance in the CEEC-5 group.
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Figure 1.4: Estimated NEWS variable in the CEEC-5 group.
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Table 1.2: Exchange rate regimes – An overview.
country variable period official regime
Czech Rep. – 27.5.1997– . . . managed floating
Hungary REG1 1.1.1999–31.12.1999 crawling band around basket (±2.25%)
(basket=USD 30%, EUR 70%)
REG2 1.1.2000–3.5.2001 crawling band around EUR (±2.25%)
REG3 4.5.2001–3.6.2003 crawling band around EUR (±15%)
(central rate 276.10 HUF/EUR)
base 4.6.2003– . . . crawling band around EUR (±15%)
(central rate 282.36 HUF/EUR)
Poland REG1 1.1.1999–24.3.1999 crawling band around basket (±12.5%)
(basket=USD 45%, EUR 55%)
REG2 25.3.1999–11.4.2000 crawling band around EUR (±15%)
base 12.4.2000– . . . managed floating
Slovakia – 1.10.1998– . . . managed floating
Slovenia REG1 1.1.1999–27.6.2004 crawling band around EUR (±2%)
base 28.6.2004– . . . ERM II
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002); Kocˇenda and Valachy (2006); national banks.
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Table 1.3: TARCH model estimations.
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
σ2 – – – – 55.8525a
– – – – (9.4673)
a1 – 0.0857
b – 0.0855a −0.2439a
– (0.0424) – (0.0316) (0.0604)
a2 – – −0.0781a – –
– – (0.0291) – –
a5 −0.4526a −0.0766 – – –
(0.1446) (0.0472) – – –
a6 – −0.0779a – – –
– (0.0287) – – –
a10 – – 0.0846
a – –
– – (0.0262) – –
b5 0.4768
a – – – –
(0.1424) – – – –
ω 2 · 10−7 9 · 10−6a 2 · 10−5a 5 · 10−6a 5 · 10−7
(1 · 10−7) (3 · 10−6) (2 · 10−6) (7 · 10−7) (8 · 10−6)
α1 0.1203
b 0.4318a 0.2000a 0.2201a 0.6542a
(0.0570) (0.1667) (0.0502) (0.0648) (0.1544)
α2 −0.0849 0.3263b 0.1276a 0.1208b 0.2167b
(0.0520) (0.1505) (0.0467) (0.0580) (0.1053)
α3 – – 0.1753
a 0.0495 –
– – (0.0491) (0.0338) –
α4 – – 0.0809
b – –
– – (0.0373) – –
β1 0.9114
a – – – –
(0.0216) – – – –
ξ 0.0779b −0.3332b −0.1995a −0.1347c –
(0.0352) (0.1550) (0.0628) (0.0822) –
# of obs. 1497 1507 1438 1469 1497
adj. R2 0.0125 0.0084 0.0070 0.0069 -0.0379
AIC -8.5043 -8.3460 -7.3190 -8.9829 -11.0550
SIC -8.4795 -8.3213 -7.2896 -8.9613 -11.0372
Note: standard errors are in parentheses; significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted
by a, b, and c superscript, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Nominal exchange rates vis-a`-vis the EUR – Data summary.
country min max mean st.dev.
Czech Republic 28.9590 38.5830 33.5196 2.2916
Hungary 234.7200 273.9200 252.9331 7.7495
Poland 3.3433 4.9346 4.1169 0.3439
Slovakia 38.5450 47.4840 42.3693 1.5187
Slovenia 187.1333 240.0300 219.6494 15.6962
Source: author’s calculations.
Table 1.5: Estimated conditional variance – Data summary.
country min max mean st.dev.
Czech Republic 3.68 · 10−6 0.000117 1.42 · 10−5 1.15 · 10−5
Hungary 9.12 · 10−6 0.001042 2.01 · 10−5 4.92 · 10−5
Poland 2.24 · 10−5 0.000740 4.42 · 10−5 3.98 · 10−5
Slovakia 5.37 · 10−6 0.000084 8.10 · 10−6 6.15 · 10−5
Slovenia 4.96 · 10−7 0.000286 2.28 · 10−6 1.03 · 10−5
Table 1.6: Variable NEWS – Data summary.
country min max mean st.dev. median
Czech Republic −0.7872 0.3244 −5.85 · 10−16 0.0564 0.0033
Hungary −12.3328 24.5462 1.03 · 10−14 1.9964 0.0222
Poland −1.9082 1.0049 1.15 · 10−15 0.1789 −0.0024
Slovakia −6.4948 7.2563 −4.19 · 10−15 0.3832 0.0021
Slovenia −2.1471 3.5324 6.41 · 10−16 0.4378 −0.0303
Note: a negative value indicates good news, a positive values indicates bad news.
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Table 1.7: Sources of exchange rate volatility – Results.
ERVt = α+β
(
Imt
GDPt
)
+γGGt∗NEWSt+γBBt∗NEWSt+δREGIMEt+εt
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
α 2 · 10−5 −1 · 10−4 2 · 10−4a 3 · 10−5a 1 · 10−4c
(3 · 10−5) (2 · 10−4) (5 · 10−5) (8 · 10−6) (6 · 10−5)
β −1 · 10−5 3 · 10−4 −4 · 10−4a −3 · 10−5b −2 · 10−4c
(6 · 10−5) (4 · 10−4) (2 · 10−4) (1 · 10−5) (1 · 10−4)
γG −7 · 10−6 – – – –
(6 · 10−6) – – – –
γG lag#1 – – −7 · 10−6b – –
– – (4 · 10−6) – –
γG lag#3 – – – 1 · 10−6b −2 · 10−6c
– – – (4 · 10−7) (1 · 10−6)
γG lag#5 – −4 · 10−6c – – –
– (2 · 10−6) – – –
γB lag#3 – – – – 7 · 10−7
– – – – (5 · 10−7)
γB lag#4 – – – 2 · 10−6d –
– – – (1 · 10−6) –
γB lag#5 −1 · 10−5c 4 · 10−7d – – –
(7 · 10−6) (3 · 10−7) – – –
γB lag#7 – – −3 · 10−5c – –
– – (1 · 10−5) – –
δREG1 – −1 · 10−5a −2 · 10−5 – −2 · 10−6
– (4 · 10−6) (2 · 10−5) – (1 · 10−6)
δREG2 – −2 · 10−5b −7 · 10−6 – –
– (1 · 10−5) (8 · 10−6) – –
δREG3 – −8 · 10−6 – – –
– (1 · 10−5) – – –
ρ 0.8511a 0.5228a 0.8170a 0.6993a 0.6630a
(0.0310) (0.1158) (0.1075) (0.0550) (0.2272)
# of obs. 1495 1506 1437 1464 1493
adj. R2 0.7405 0.2901 0.6753 0.5303 0.4594
Note: standard errors are in parentheses; significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% level is
denoted by a, b, c, and d superscript, respectively. Parameter ρ is included to account for
serial correlation in residuals.
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Horizontal and Vertical FDI
Spillovers: Recent Evidence
from the Czech Republic
(CERGE-EI Working Paper #340)
2.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a driving force of growth in developing
economies. It brings new capital, technology and know-how (Dunning, 1994;
Gorodnichenko et al., 2008). Foreign-owned companies are typically char-
acterized by higher productivity and competitiveness compared to domestic
ones (e.g., Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). This is often referred to as the direct
effect of FDI.
FDI can also have a variety of indirect effects on domestic companies. The
entry of any high-productivity company should naturally encourage other
companies within the same sector to improve their performance. Such in-
crease in the efficiency of the production process can occur through copying
new technologies or by hiring trained workers and managers from foreign-
owned companies (Javorcik, 2004). On the other hand, those domestic com-
panies that are not able to catch up with the high performance of competitors
within the sector may be crowded out of the market. These productivity ef-
fects are referred to as horizontal spillovers.
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Companies from sectors other than that of the foreign enterprise might
also be affected by its presence, if they are in direct business contact with its
sector. This includes companies that supply or provide services for foreign
firms, as well as companies whose inputs are supplied by foreign enterprises or
their sectors. It is likely that foreign companies require higher standards from
their suppliers. On the other hand, it is also likely that higher standards are
provided by foreign companies to domestic companies as well, which might
improve the domestic companies’ efficiency and performance. These effects
are referred to as vertical spillovers.
Expectations of strong positive direct as well as indirect benefits from
FDI lead most transition (i.e., post-communist) and developing countries to
present themselves as attractive places for investment and to attract foreign
investors by offering them various advantages. The Czech Republic is no
exception. In 1998, its government approved a system of subsidies for foreign
investors that aimed at increasing the competitiveness of Czech industry.1
However, to-date the issue of the actual effect of FDI is not settled.
Although the literature studying the effects of FDI on domestic companies
is extensive and the empirical studies focusing on both transition and devel-
oped countries are numerous (e.g., Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Kinoshita,
2000; Haskel et al., 2002; Damijan et al., 2003b; Javorcik, 2004; Sabirianova
et al., 2005; Kosova´, 2009), their findings are ambiguous and in many cases
contradictory, even for the same country. Clearly, the findings are sensitive
to each country’s unique experience, quality of data, time period or applied
methodology.
In particular, most of the studies of the Czech Republic suffer from re-
lying on small samples and focusing on the early transition period. Early
transition, i.e., 1991-1996, is characterized by mass privatization and unclear
ownership structures, whereas the main boom of foreign investment came
after 1998 (see Figure 2.1 in the Appendix), which is the last sample year in
almost every previous study about the Czech Republic.2 Therefore, it may
not be significant that previous studies often do not succeed in finding any
spillover effects.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the effects of FDI on the performance
1http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xchg/mfcr/hs.xsl/inv pob vyvoj.html
2Kosova´ (2009) is the only exception; her data end in 2001.
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of domestic companies in the Czech Republic during 1995-2003. I study the
productivity effects of FDI within the same sector as well as the potential
gains through vertical linkages. The value added of the present paper vis-a`-
vis the existing literature on the Czech Republic is in considering both the
horizontal impact and the backward and forward vertical spillovers, and in
employing up-to-date data. I also shed light on the sources of identification
of FDI spillover effects and pay attention to the potential endogeneity of FDI
with respect to future industry growth.
Contrary to expectations and the arguments supporting FDI subsidies,
this paper finds that foreign investors contribute negatively to the (sales)
performance of domestic companies, especially to those in upstream sectors.
In other words, domestic companies in sectors supplying foreign-owned firms
are negatively affected by the presence of foreign investors through a nega-
tive backward spillover. One underlying explanation supported by indirect
evidence is that foreign investors prefer to import their supplies from abroad,
such that Czech companies oriented mainly on domestic markets suffer. This
effect becomes even more evident after accounting for the endogeneity of FDI.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the relevant
existing studies. My research strategy is explained in the Section 2.3. The
Section 2.4 contains the data description. The empirical results are presented
in the Section 2.5. The last section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This section reviews several key papers on FDI spillover effects. I discuss
three studies with significant value added to the literature. The second half
of this section then looks more closely at the papers concerning the Czech
Republic.
One of the first studies investigating the benefits for domestic companies
from FDI using company-level panel data is Aitken and Harrison (1999).
They use a sample of about 5, 000 companies in Venezuela during the years
1976-1989. They find a positive effect of FDI on domestic companies with
less than 50 employees and a small negative effect of FDI on all domestic
companies. They further claim that the positive effect of the presence of for-
eign enterprises is solely due to joint ventures with foreign capital. In a more
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recent study, Haskel et al. (2002) use a sample of more than 90% of all man-
ufacturing firms in the UK from 1973-1992. According to their results, there
is a positive horizontal spillover effect on total factor productivity (TFP)
within sectors, which takes some time to permeate the domestic companies.
Javorcik (2004) is the first study to focus not only on horizontal spillovers,
but also on vertical spillover effects; she also sheds some light on the mech-
anism of such vertical linkages. Her research is based on a sample of 85%
of all Lithuanian companies in the period 1996-2000. She does not find any
significant horizontal spillover effects; however, she finds a positive backward
spillover effect of FDI on domestic companies. As regards the determinants
of spillovers, she finds that the effect is more prevalent when foreign-owned
companies are domestic-market rather than export-oriented, and that there is
no difference in magnitude between the effects from partially or fully foreign-
owned companies.
There are several firm-level studies of FDI in the Czech Republic. Djankov
and Hoekman (2000) study the impact of FDI on the TFP growth of recipient
firms between 1992-1996 and find this impact to be positive and significant.3
On the other hand, the effect of joint ventures is less positive and not sta-
tistically significant. As regards the spillover effects, they find a negative
horizontal spillover effect of FDI and joint ventures, taken together, on do-
mestic companies. However, they use a sample of only 513 firms.
Kinoshita (2000) uses a larger data set covering 1, 217 manufacturing
firms during the period 1995-1998. She finds no significant technology spill-
over effect of joint ventures or FDI on productivity growth neither within
the firm nor within the industry. On the other hand, she contends that this
effect varies hugely across sectors and is positive and significant for oligopolis-
tic sectors, such as radio and TV or electrical machinery. Kinoshita further
examines the two roles of the firm’s R&D – innovation and absorptive capac-
ity. According to her results, the effects of FDI are significant for firms that
perform their own R&D – the horizontal spillover is positive and the direct
effect is negative, whereas the direct effect of R&D on productivity growth
3In a related analysis, Jurajda and Stancˇ´ık (2009) study the impact of foreign ownership
on corporate performance. Based on a sample of 4, 049 companies from the period 1995-
2005 and using the matched difference-in-differences approach, they conclude that foreign
takeovers significantly boost several corporate performance indicators in non-exporting
manufacturing industries, but have little effect in other industries.
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remains insignificant.
Jarol´ım (2001) concentrates mainly on the performance of foreign-owned
companies, but he examines also the horizontal spillover effects of FDI on
domestic companies within the same sector. For this purpose, he uses a
sample of 3, 152 enterprises from the manufacturing sector over the period
1993-1998. In line with the previous literature, he shows that foreign-owned
companies are characterized by higher TFP. However, he does not find any
significant horizontal spillover effects. Moreover, he compares the perfor-
mance of greenfield ventures with foreign acquisitions and concludes that the
former perform significantly better.
Damijan et al. (2003a) examine the direct effect of FDI, intra-industry
knowledge spillovers from FDI and the impact of firms’ own R&D accumu-
lation on productivity growth using a sample of eight transition countries4
in the period 1994-1998. Regarding the Czech Republic, they use a sample
of 1, 115 manufacturing companies and find a positive direct effect of FDI
on domestic recipient companies. Intra-industry spillovers are found to be
insignificant, but, similarly to findings in Kinoshita (2000), their significance
increases when controlling for a firm’s own R&D. Surprisingly, the produc-
tivity growth of Czech companies that perform their own R&D decreases
with foreign presence in the industry. Moreover, according to their results,
most domestic firms’ knowledge and technology improvements are gained
from their trade partners abroad.
In a closely related study, Damijan et al. (2003b) use the sample of Dami-
jan et al. (2003a), add Lithuania and Latvia, and study the period 1995-1999.
Their analysis incorporates not only horizontal but also vertical spillovers.
They conclude that vertical spillover effects are more important than hor-
izontal effects. Particularly, both of these effects are positive in the Czech
Republic. In terms of direct effects of foreign ownership, these new findings
contradict their previous study, especially when they imply that companies
with foreign presence have lower productivity growth than companies with-
out foreign capital. The contribution of a firm’s own R&D is not confirmed
to be significant, which is also in contrast to their previous study.
Kosova´ (2009) studies the effect of FDI on the productivity of domestic
4Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slove-
nia.
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firms and the crowding-out effect from the presence of foreign companies. She
uses a sample of 9, 986 Czech companies from all sectors covering the period
1994-2001. She finds a positive effect of foreign capital presence on domestic
firms’ growth and survival. She concludes that exit rates are lower for com-
panies in industries with foreign presence. Moreover, she finds that a positive
intra-industry technological spillover effect is present in more technologically
advanced industries.5
These mixed results are summarized in Table 2.1. The employed samples
are rather small, except for the last two papers, and most of these studies
examine the period before 1999 when there was relatively little FDI inflow
into the Czech Republic. Further, most of the previous literature is limited
to manufacturing sectors only. However, it is likely that domestic companies
from service sectors would be especially affected by the presence of foreign
investors. Unlike manufacturing companies, these companies are not able
to export their services abroad and they are limited to the domestic market
only. Overall, there is every kind of horizontal spillover found in the previous
literature – negative, insignificant, and positive – while the only two papers
that study vertical spillovers find them to be positive.6
2.3 Research Approach
2.3.1 Theoretical Model
The goal of this paper is to examine whether sales growth is affected by the
share of foreign capital within and across sectors. For this purpose, I follow
the methodology of Haddad and Harrison (1993). They assume a production
function with value added Y that is a function of two inputs, capital K and
labor L:
Yijt = Ajtf(Kijt, Lijt).
5In a related line of work, Kosova´ and Ayyagari (2006) ask about the impact of FDI
on domestic entrepreneurship. Based on a sample of 9, 979 Czech companies covering the
period 1994-2000, they find that foreign presence contributes positively to the entry rates
of domestic companies through both horizontal and vertical spillovers.
6In international comparison, the estimated effects for the Czech Republic are similar
to those from the region of Central Europe (Damijan et al., 2003b). On the other hand,
these effects have either different sign or bigger magnitude in Balkan countries (Damijan
et al., 2003b; Javorcik, 2004). These studies focus on particular countries separately, while
Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) perform their firm-level analysis using a joint sample from 27
countries. They find positive backward spillovers.
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The level of productivity is given by Ajt. It is assumed to vary across sectors
j and time t. By using total differential, taking logs, and using the fact that
the value of the marginal product for each factor equals its cost, I have
∆ lnY ijt =
∆Ajt
Ajt
+ α1∆ lnK ijt + α2∆ lnLijt, (2.1)
where ∆A
A
is productivity growth. The coefficients on the growth of labor
and capital are simply their share in value added. I test the hypothesis that
productivity growth is affected by the share of foreign capital both within
and across sectors by assuming that productivity growth can be decomposed
into the following components:
∆Ajt
Ajt
= α0 + α3HORIZjt + α4BACKjt + α5FORWjt + αt + εijt, (2.2)
whereHORIZ, BACK, and FORW are FDI variables and the set of dummy
variables, αt, is introduced to control for year-specific effects. A disturbance
term εijt is added to account for possible changes in productivity growth due
to stochastic shocks at the firm or sector level over time. Combining (2.1)
and (2.2) yields the equation I estimate:
∆ lnY ijt =α0 + α1∆ lnK ijt + α2∆ lnLijt + α3HORIZjt + α4BACKjt+
+ α5FORWjt + αt + εijt. (2.3)
2.3.2 Spillover Variables
For the sake of continuity and comparability with previous studies, I follow
the approach of Javorcik (2004) and create three spillover variables repre-
senting the stock of foreign capital at sectoral level. The variable HORIZjt
measures the foreign presence within a sector; it represents the share of for-
eign capital invested in foreign companies7 in sector j at time t and is defined
as
HORIZjt =
∑
i:i∈j,FSijt≥0.1 FSijtFAijt∑
i:i∈j FAijt
, (2.4)
where FSijt denotes the share of foreign capital in firm i at time t in sector j
and FAijt denotes the fixed assets of firm i at time t in sector j.
7I interpret a company as foreign if it has at least 10% of its equity owned by a foreign
investor. The same threshold is also used in the Czech National Bank official definition of
FDI and in Damijan et al. (2003b) and Javorcik (2004).
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The variable BACKjt represents the weighted share of foreign capital in
all sectors that are supplied by sector j at time t and, conversely, the variable
FORWjt represents the weighted share of foreign capital in all sectors that
supply sector j at time t. They are defined as
BACKjt =
∑
k:k 6=j βjktHORIZkt (2.5)
FORWjt =
∑
k:k 6=j βkjtHORIZkt, (2.6)
where βxyt stands for the fraction of output from sector x supplied to sector y
at time t. BACKjt measures the presence of foreign companies downstream
of a domestically owned firm’s sector and FORWjt measures the presence of
foreign companies upstream.
2.4 Data
The company-level annual data used here come from the ASPEKT database,
which is a Czech source for the Amadeus pan-European database and is
widely used in empirical research (Hanousek et al., 2007; Bena and Hanousek,
2006). Financial data cover the period 1993-2004, include 24, 648 Czech firms
in total and form an unbalanced panel, where the number of usable companies
varies from almost 2, 000 in 1993 to more than 17, 000 in 2002. The ASPEKT
database also provides information about companies’ ownership structure.
However, due to the limited availability of this information, the total number
of companies is significantly reduced to 1/6.8 Ownership information allows
me to distinguish foreign companies from domestic ones. In contrast to most
previous studies, I do not limit the analysis only to the manufacturing sectors.
With few exceptions, I employ data from all sectors; only sectors with a strong
regulatory role of the government are excluded.9
For studying vertical spillover effects, I employ inter-industry data (input-
output matrices) that come from the Czech Statistical Office (CSO).10 A
8This reduced sample comprises mostly larger companies and the correlation between
the full and reduced sample across 2-digit NACE industries is 0.95. With respect to fixed
assets, the coverage of this reduced sample vs. total economy is about 12%.
9Agriculture, forestry, fishing, utilities, public administration, health and education;
NACE codes 1, 2, 5, 40, 41, 75, 80, and 85.
10In a recent study, Barrios et al. (2009) claim that input sourcing behavior of foreign
companies differs from that of domestic firms and, moreover, it is distinct for each country
of origin. Therefore, they suggest alternative measures of backward linkages that employ
foreign countries’ input-output tables.
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significant improvement over the existing literature11 is that I have these
matrices available for every year during 1995-2003. Previous studies use the
assumption that these matrices do not change much over time. However,
the opposite is true. Descriptive analysis reveals that for almost 30% of
relations,12 the standard deviation over time is bigger than the mean value.
In order to remove possible measurement errors, I use fitted values of time
trends based on these matrices instead of the original values. In other words,
I still have a different input-output matrix for each year, but these matrices
now capture trends rather than the dramatically oscillating annual values.
After merging all variables and performing several data cleaning proce-
dures, the resulting sample covers the period 1995-2003 and contains infor-
mation about 4, 002 companies from 43 industries,13 20, 908 firm-year obser-
vations in total. An overview of the time and ownership structure of the final
sample is provided in Table 2.2. The number of companies varies from 1, 323
in 1995 to 2, 733 in 2000. Foreign companies represent 25% of all observa-
tions. Table 2.3 shows the summary statistics of all variables used in this
research. Inputs to production such as fixed assets or staff costs as well as
sales of Czech companies are increasing on average. As regards the owner-
ship structure, the average share of a foreign investor in a Czech company is
almost 19%.
Although the model described in the Section 2.3.1 assumes value added
as a dependent variable, I employ sales instead. The main reason for this
discrepancy is the limited availability of value added which is less than half
with respect to sales. A natural solution in this case would be to control for
material costs. Unfortunately, this approach is not feasible as well due to the
lack of material costs data. The accent in this study is put rather on size of
the usable sample. To verify this choice, Table 2.11 provides a comparison of
the results when value added is used instead of sales. There are two different
subsamples compared for illustration. Since, the character of those results
for both cases is very similar, statistically as well as economically, I can
11Damijan et al. (2003b), Javorcik (2004), or Kosova´ and Ayyagari (2006).
12A relation is a time series of the flow of goods and services from sector X to sector
Y for the whole period 1995-2003. There are almost 7, 000 such relations – for every
combination of sectors X and Y , as well as for the supply and demand relationship. These
relations are used to generate a mean value and standard deviation for every time series.
13At 2-digit NACE classification (Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community).
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expect that the results would not differ much, if I employed value added as
a dependent variable.
2.5 Estimation Results
2.5.1 Baseline Specification
In order to study the horizontal and vertical spillover effects from FDI, the
following modification of model (2.3) is estimated:
∆ ln SALES ijt =γi + α1∆ lnFAijt + α2∆ ln SC ijt + α3HORIZjt + α4BACKjt+
+ α5FORWjt + αt + εijt, (2.7)
where SALES ijt, FAijt, and SC ijt stand for sales, fixed assets, and staff costs,
respectively, for firm i at time t in sector j. The set of year dummy vari-
ables, αt, is also introduced. To capture company differences in time-constant
firm-level unobserved characteristics, e.g., management or technology, the
specification conditions on the firm’s fixed effect γi.
A positive value of the variable HORIZjt would imply that the presence
of foreign companies in the sector has a positive impact on the productivity
of domestic companies in the same sector. A positive value of the variable
BACKjt would imply that the presence of foreign companies has a positive
impact on the productivity of those domestic companies that supply the
foreign companies’ sector. Similarly, a positive value of the variable FORWjt
would imply that the presence of foreign companies has a positive impact on
the productivity of those domestic companies that are supplied by the foreign
companies’ sector. Since the goal of this paper is to study the effects on
domestic companies, model (2.7), as well as all further models, are estimated
on a sample of “always-domestic” companies only. This sample excludes
companies that are foreign at any time during the sample frame. It allows
one to study the pure spillover effects of FDI that are not affected by the
better performance of either foreign greenfield companies, local companies
that have been taken over by a foreign entity or local companies that are
about to become foreign in the near future. However, for comparison, I also
estimate model (2.7) using the whole company population as well, including
foreign companies.
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Another reason for using the always-domestic firms is the potential endo-
geneity of ownership at the firm level. Foreign investors can acquire “better”
domestic companies, i.e., those with superior current or future performance.
The inclusion of domestic firms that will be bought up by foreign owners
later could bias the estimated coefficients towards negative values. In order
to check whether this is the case, I also run regression (2.7) on a sample of
companies that are always domestic plus the companies that will be acquired
by foreign investors in the future during the period 1995-2003 but are still
domestic as of the current period.
The estimates from these regressions are summarized in Table 2.4. The
first column includes the estimated coefficients using a sample of always-
domestic companies. The coefficients of capital and labor inputs are positive
and significant, which is in line with expectations. However, the coefficient
of the horizontal spillover variable is insignificant. This result partially cor-
responds to previous studies that mostly do not find any significant hori-
zontal spillover effects. The coefficient of the forward spillover variable is
insignificant as well. Only in the case of backward spillovers is the estimated
coefficient significant and negative.14 The estimates suggest that domestic
companies supplying foreign companies are negatively affected by the pres-
ence of FDI: a 1% increase in foreign capital’s share in a downstream sector
causes a decrease in the growth rate of the sales of supplying domestic com-
panies by almost 1.4 percentage points.
Table 2.4 also presents the results from the estimation using a population
of “up-to-now-domestic” companies. The results are consistent with little
cherry picking by foreign investors as the estimated coefficients have basically
the same magnitudes compared to those based on the sample of “always-
domestic” companies.
2.5.2 Does FDI Encourage Sales Growth or Vice Versa?
The idea behind equation (2.7) is that when a foreign investor comes to the
Czech Republic and brings new technologies or expertise, domestic companies
consequently become more efficient. However, the causality direction does
not have to be so straightforward. Foreign investors usually come to sectors
14The only previous study of vertical spillover effects on productivity growth rate, which
implies a positive backward spillover effect, is Damijan et al. (2003b).
41
Chapter 2: Horizontal and Vertical FDI Spillovers
where they expect high profitability. Such sectors are characterized either by
low productivity of most of the domestic companies within that sector or by
an ongoing or nascent boom. Under the latter reasoning, an increase in sales
growth may not be caused by foreign investors, but the future growth of a
sector may attract foreign investors.
In order to capture the possibility that foreign investors coming to the
Czech Republic choose sectors with increasing sales growth in the future, the
following modification of model (2.7) is estimated using the domestic-only
subsample:
∆ ln SALES ijt =γi + α1∆ lnFAijt + α2∆ ln SC ijt + α3HORIZ
inflow
jt+1 +
+ α4BACK
inflow
jt+1 + α5FORW
inflow
jt+1 + αt + εijt, (2.8)
where the variable HORIZ inflowjt+1 represents the share of the inflow of foreign
capital into sector j at time t+1 over the total amount of fixed assets within
that sector in that year. The variable BACK inflowjt+1 represents the weighted
share of the inflow of foreign capital into all sectors that are supplied by
sector j at time t+1 and, similarly, the variable FORW inflowjt+1 represents the
weighted share of the inflow of foreign capital into all sectors that supply
sector j at time t + 1. The definition of foreign-presence variables is similar
to that from Section 2.3.2 except that I use flows, not stocks, and I look one
period ahead. The results of the estimation of this model are summarized in
Table 2.5. The time span is now only 1995-2002 because lead values are used.
Looking at the results, the coefficients of horizontal, backward, and forward
spillover variables in both cases are significant and positive. These positive
“spillover” coefficients do not correspond to any effects of FDI on domestic
growth as the foreign capital inflow has not yet occurred. Instead, they
indicate that investors are influenced by the overall increase of the sectoral
sales growth rate and they tend to go either to sectors with an expected
higher sales growth rate and to sectors that are upstream/downstream from
these growing sectors.15
15This claim is further supported by regressing the lead horizontal spillover variable
on the sales growth rate when the corresponding coefficient is positive and significant.
Similarly, I find the same result when using the lead backward or forward spillover instead.
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2.5.3 Allowing for the Endogeneity of FDI
The results presented in Table 2.5 provide sufficient reason to expect that
foreign investment is not completely exogenous and that it is necessary to
minimize this endogeneity, which stems from ex ante industry growth oppor-
tunity affecting both observed growth rates and FDI inflow. Some headway
can be achieved by finding a variable that is correlated with the sales growth
rate but is not affected by foreign investment, i.e., to approximate the coun-
terfactual growth opportunity at the industry level. A natural choice is to
look abroad and find such proxy in the remaining Visegrad Four countries,
i.e., Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The economies of these countries are
similar to and linked with the Czech economy16 such that when there is a
boom in one of these country’s industries, it is likely that this boom occurs
also in the same industry across the border. Table 2.6 summarizes the re-
sults from a regression of Czech industry-level production on production in
the remaining Visegrad countries, both in level and log form.17 These results
suggest that the Czech economy is closely linked to the economies of Hungary
and Slovakia, while the linkage with Poland is much weaker. However, both
Hungary and Poland are not suitable as counterfactual industry growth prox-
ies because they became attractive to foreign investors much earlier than the
Czech Republic and their industry growth is already impacted by FDI.18 The
only suitable country remains Slovakia. Foreign investment in Slovakia lags
behind the Czech Republic’s by 4− 5 years with the main investment boom
starting in 2002. Thus, the production growth rate in Slovakia is not affected
by massive foreign investment almost during the whole time span used in this
paper and it can be used to proxy a “natural” level of production19 in the
Czech Republic. Specifically, I regress the Czech industry-level production on
Slovak production in the years 1990-1997 and use this regression to predict
the Czech “natural” industry production during 1995-2003. This predicted
16Boone and Maurel (1998), Horva´th (2002), Firdmuc (2008).
17The data for this regression comes from the OECD STAN database.
18Hungary was attracting FDI even before 1989, reaching its peak in 1995 (4.5 bil.
USD, 9.8% of GDP). FDI inflow was then declining till 2001 when it started to rise again.
The FDI inflows into Poland were rather modest until 1994, but started to grow in 1995.
Poland attracted a record amount of foreign investment in 2000 (10.6 bil. USD, 6.2% of
GDP).
19This is a level of production that is assumed to be realized by an industry in the Czech
Republic, had it not received any FDI.
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industry growth rate is then used to lower the extent of endogeneity of FDI
in the following modification of model (2.7):
∆ ln SALES ijt =γi + α1∆ lnFAijt + α2∆ ln SC ijt + α3HORIZjt+
+ α4BACKjt + α5FORWjt +∆ lnPROD
CZ
jt + αt + εijt,
(2.9)
where the variable ∆ lnPRODCZjt stands for the predicted “natural” produc-
tion growth rate in sector j at time t in the Czech Republic. The results
are summarized in Table 2.7, again with separate columns for each sample.20
Similarly to the results presented in Table 2.4 and corresponding to model
(2.7), the new results indicate neither significant horizontal nor forward spill-
over effects. Regarding backward spillovers, the coefficients are still negative
and significant. Their magnitude is higher in comparison to those from the
baseline specification by about 20%. This evidence is consistent with the no-
tion of lowering industry FDI endogeneity with previous results being biased
towards positive spillovers because of an underlying growth rate differential
that may be mistakenly causally linked with FDI. Even though the Czech-
Slovak comparison hardly presents a perfect natural experiment, it has been
used in existing research (Ham et al., 1998) and may be as close as we can
get to causal evidence on FDI in transition.
According to these results, domestic companies are negatively affected by
the presence of foreign investors in downstream sectors. The next question
is: what makes the sales growth rates of these companies lower? A sugges-
tive answer can be found in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. The first column of Table
2.9 shows the results from a regression of industry imports, the amount of
goods and services imported to sector j at time t from abroad, on the share
of foreign capital. The positive coefficient of HORIZjt suggests that foreign
investors tend to import their supplies from abroad rather than use domestic
suppliers. In addition, according to Table 2.10, domestic companies oriented
at foreign markets are able to deal with this fact. The regression in Table
2.10 is run on the firm level, although companies are divided into export-
and non-export-oriented groups based on data on the sector level. A sector
is considered to be export-oriented if it exports on average over the period
20Again, the comparison between “always-domestic” and “up-to-now-domestic” samples
is consistent with little cherry picking by foreign investors.
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1995-2003 at least 50% of its production abroad. Although the correspond-
ing coefficient of the backward spillover variable is negative, it is statistically
insignificant. However, domestic companies oriented mostly on the domestic
market have nobody else to supply. In this case, there is a significant and
negative backward spillover effect. Since the number of these domestically-
oriented companies is higher than that of the export-oriented, this negative
effect dominates when the combined sample of all “always-domestic” compa-
nies is employed.
2.5.4 FDI Spillovers on Various Subsamples
The previous results indicate that there are strong backward spillover effects
from FDI on domestic companies. However, these effects may be prevalent or
stronger only in some period of time or in some specific group of companies.
Fortunately, the sample used in this paper is sufficiently big which allows for
the creation of several smaller subsamples. Thus, the regression (2.9) is run
stepwise on samples from the periods 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003.
Moreover, it is run on a sample from the period 1998-2003 to see the impact
of FDI on domestic companies after the boom in 1998. Then, it is run also
on a sample of “smaller” companies. In this case, a company is defined as
“smaller at time t” if its amount of fixed assets in year t is lower than the
average amount of fixed assets of all companies within the same sector in
the same year t. This case is interesting because there are potentially two
opposite effects. Due to their smaller size, these companies are more flexible
and able to adjust more quickly to a new situation in a market. On the
other hand, precisely because of their smaller size, they have only limited
sources for improving their technologies or hiring new managers. Finally, the
regression (2.9) is run on samples of only-manufacturing companies as well as
only-service companies to see the impact of FDI on these specific industries.
The results of estimated coefficients from those seven regressions on sub-
samples of always-domestic companies are summarized in Table 2.8. The co-
efficients of inputs are almost the same as with the original sample. The only
difference is that the coefficient of fixed assets is significant only for service
sectors, “smaller” companies and the period after 1997. The results further
suggest that there are neither horizontal nor forward spillover effects of FDI
in the period 1998-2003 as corresponding coefficients are non-significant. Al-
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though these effects are present with negative values in the earlier as well
as the later period, they are dominated by years 1998-2000 with correspond-
ing positive values. Negative horizontal spillovers can be probably explained
by increased competition within sectors. Regarding forward spillover effects,
their negative values in years 1995-1997 and 2001-2003 can be explained by
similar arguments as in the case of backward spillovers on the whole sam-
ple of always-domestic companies. According to Tables 2.9 and 2.10, foreign
companies tend to export their products abroad which makes domestically
oriented consuming domestic companies suffer. Although the last columns
in Table 2.10 are related to the period 2001-2003, the results are qualita-
tively the same also for the period 1995-1997. On the other hand, positive
backward spillovers in years 2001-2003 can be assigned to increased effort of
domestic companies to satisfy their foreign customers.
The situation for “smaller” companies just copies the overall results with
only negative backward spillovers. Thus, as regards to the potential opposite
effects mentioned above, the effect of “smaller” companies’ limited sources
dominates their flexibility. While the results for manufacturing companies
do not reveal any significant spillovers, the last column shows that especially
the service sector is the one who suffers in the presence of foreign investors
upstream. This is a natural result because service companies are almost
completely domestically oriented and usually they are not forced by domes-
tic market to improve their products. Therefore, it is even harder for them
to adjust to the presence of foreign companies. However, surprisingly, for-
ward spillovers are found positive which might suggest an ability of domestic
companies to improve themselves once they are offered products and services
from foreign companies from upstream sectors.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the spillover effects of FDI on the sales growth of
domestic Czech companies over the period 1995-2003. I estimate both hor-
izontal spillovers within an industry and vertical spillovers, i.e., the FDI
indirect effects on supplying or purchasing domestic companies from other
sectors. Moreover, this study attempts to minimize the likely endogeneity of
FDI with respect to future industry growth.
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Contrary to the arguments supporting the subsidization of FDI, this pa-
per finds that foreign investors contribute negatively to the performance of
domestic companies. The results suggest the presence of negative backward
spillover effects from FDI. A 1 percentage point increase in foreign capital
in a downstream sector causes a decrease in the growth rate of sales of sup-
plying domestic companies by almost two percentage points. This result is
consistent with domestic suppliers suffering in the presence of foreign compa-
nies, which tend to import their inputs from abroad instead of using domestic
suppliers. The estimates are significantly affected by controlling for an indus-
try growth counterfactual proxy, suggesting that existing positive spillover
effects should be interpreted with caution.
Even though I conclude that foreign investors contribute negatively to
the performance of domestic companies, such evidence is not sufficient to ar-
gue that one should not encourage FDI. Besides the evidence that companies
receiving foreign investment are typically characterized by higher productiv-
ity (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005), there are numerous other potential positive
effects, that are difficult to evaluate.
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2.8 Appendix
Figure 2.1: FDI inflow into the Czech Republic.
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Table 2.2: Number of companies by year.
The column “frequency” includes information about the number of companies from each
year, the column “foreign” includes the number of foreign companies within each year.
Percentage column includes the shares from the total number of companies from each year
(“frequency” column).
year frequency foreign foreign (%)
1995 1 323 127 10%
1996 1 974 267 14%
1997 2 325 396 17%
1998 2 518 502 20%
1999 2 623 631 24%
2000 2 733 766 28%
2001 2 600 835 32%
2002 2 529 894 35%
2003 2 283 814 36%
Total 20 908 5 232 25%
Table 2.3: Summary statistics.
The variable foreign (%) denotes the share of foreign capital in a company. The variable
horizontal foreign presence represents the share of foreign capital invested within a sector,
the variable backward foreign presence represents the weighted share of foreign capital in all
sectors that are supplied by a sector, and the variable forward foreign presence represents
the weighted share of foreign capital in all sectors that supply a sector.
variable observations mean std. deviation min max
sales (ths. CZK) 20 908 622 108 3 019 073 100 154 000 000
fixed assets (ths. CZK) 20 908 418 567 2 893 904 100 130 500 000
staff costs (ths. CZK) 20 908 70 691 282 379 10 8 153 205
∆ ln sales 20 908 0.015 0.896 -8.719 14.458
∆ ln fixed assets 20 908 0.057 0.683 -7.052 11.785
∆ ln staff costs 20 908 0.079 0.571 -6.136 9.968
∆ ln value added 10 190 0.089 0.712 -6.711 10.285
∆ lnCZ production 18 026 0.020 0.040 -0.128 0.300
foreign (%) 20 908 18.980 36.584 0 100.275
horizontal foreign presence 20 908 0.218 0.185 0 1
backward foreign presence 20 908 0.146 0.096 0.002 0.667
forward foreign presence 20 908 0.136 0.083 0.011 0.429
52
Chapter 2: Horizontal and Vertical FDI Spillovers
Table 2.4: Baseline specification.
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI. The
dependent variable is ∆ lnSALES . The first column represents the model with spillovers
examined on the sample of always-domestic companies, the second represents spillovers
estimated on the sample of up-to-now-domestic companies, and the last one shows the
results using the sample of all companies, including the foreign owned.
always-domestic up-to-now-domestic whole population
const 0.283*** 0.285*** 0.323***
(0.090) (0.084) (0.094)
∆ lnFA 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.046***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
∆ lnSC 0.662*** 0.671*** 0.691***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.030)
Horizontal -0.120 -0.106 -0.099
(0.136) (0.135) (0.135)
Backward -1.389*** -1.373*** -1.677***
(0.448) (0.445) (0.452)
Forward -0.393 -0.367 -0.528
(0.380) (0.398) (0.415)
Year dummies yes yes yes
N 14 833 15 676 20 908
F statistic 43.344 43.595 60.177
Note: Regressions with firms’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses;
they have been corrected for clustering for each sector-year; significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table 2.5: The specification with lead flow of FDI.
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of foreign invest-
ment that will flow into the Czech Republic in the next year. The dependent variable is
∆ lnSALES .
always-domestic whole population
const 0.140* 0.162*
(0.080) (0.084)
∆ lnFA 0.068*** 0.050***
(0.018) (0.016)
∆ lnSC 0.698*** 0.716***
(0.036) (0.031)
Inflow Horizontalt+1 0.378** 0.307*
(0.151) (0.163)
Inflow Backwardt+1 0.710 0.762
(0.529) (0.499)
Inflow Forwardt+1 1.565** 1.614**
(0.707) (0.761)
Year dummies yes yes
N 13 364 18 625
F statistic 43.764 60.697
Note: Regressions with firms’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses;
they have been corrected for clustering for each sector-year; significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
53
Chapter 2: Horizontal and Vertical FDI Spillovers
Table 2.6: The relationship between production of the CR and other V4
countries.
This table presents the relationship between the level of production in the Czech Republic
and the remaining Visegrad countries at NACE2 level. The first column represents the
level specification, while the second one represents the log specification. The dependent
variable is production in the CR at NACE2 level. Time span is 1990-2003.
specification level log
const 5 990 077 3.132***
(10 300 000) (1.143)
Slovakia 2.116*** 0.296**
(0.586) (0.117)
Poland -0.188 0.198
(0.612) (0.130)
Hungary 0.091** 0.349***
(0.037) (0.119)
N 400 400
R2 0.694 0.787
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected for clustering
for each sector; significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *,
respectively.
Table 2.7: Regression with forecasted Czech production growth rate.
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI when
accounting for natural growth in an economy using forecasted data about Czech pro-
duction. The dependent variable is ∆ lnSALES . The first column represents the model
with spillovers examined on a sample of always-domestic companies, the second represents
spillovers estimated on a sample of up-to-now-domestic companies, and the last shows the
results using a sample of all companies.
always-domestic up-to-now-domestic whole population
const 0.252*** 0.249*** 0.289***
(0.093) (0.088) (0.097)
∆ lnFA 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.039**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
∆ lnSC 0.662*** 0.678*** 0.699***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.032)
Horizontal -0.135 -0.113 -0.125
(0.137) (0.138) (0.138)
Backward -1.658*** -1.644*** -2.034***
(0.524) (0.521) (0.501)
Forward -0.254 -0.210 -0.333
(0.388) (0.414) (0.430)
∆ lnPRODCzech 1.106*** 1.060*** 1.058***
(0.334) (0.328) (0.361)
Year dummies yes yes yes
N 12 693 13 429 18 026
F statistic 35.459 35.285 48.900
Note: Regressions with firms’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses;
they have been corrected for clustering for each sector-year; significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 2.9: The relationship between FDI and import (export).
This table presents the results from the regression of sector import (export) on the share
of foreign capital within the sector.
dependent variable ln IMPORTjt lnEXPORT jt
const 8.458*** 8.993***
(0.191) (0.129)
HORIZjt 1.652*** 1.409***
(0.468) (0.332)
N 361 367
R2 0.022 0.040
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table 2.10: Division by (non)exporting and (non)importing sectors.
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI on sev-
eral different subsamples of always-domestic companies. The division is done according
to exporting and importing strategies on sector level. First two columns represents the
division of the whole time span into non-exporting and exporting sectors; the last two
represents the division of the shorter time span into non-importing and importing sectors
on the other hand. The former one explains negative backward spillover effects found in
regression (2.9), while the latter one explains negative forward spillover effects found in
Table 2.8. The dependent variable is ∆ lnSALES .
sample always-domestic only years 2001-2003
sectors non-export export non-import import
const 0.328*** 0.101*** 0.288 1.146**
(0.106) (0.035) (0.362) (0.469)
∆ lnFA 0.078*** 0.012 -0.002 0.119
(0.023) (0.044) (0.049) (0.091)
∆ lnSC 0.629*** 0.813*** 0.671*** 0.645***
(0.041) (0.058) (0.085) (0.114)
Horizontal -0.118 -0.256** -0.630*** -0.790
(0.187) (0.100) (0.220) (0.509)
Backward -2.760*** -0.392 3.184** -1.809
(0.731) (0.331) (1.272) (3.027)
Forward 0.517 -1.731*** -4.481*** -1.816
(0.490) (0.458) (1.599) (3.309)
∆ lnPRODCZ 1.078*** 0.175 -0.084 0.500
(0.357) (0.320) (0.447) (0.789)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 9 790 2 903 3 763 517
F statistic 26.328 32.786 16.765 80.986
Note: Regressions with firms’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
they have been corrected for clustering for each sector-year; significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Comparison of the results – sales vs. value added.
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI using a
sample of always-domestic companies. Two different performance measures are compared
here – ∆ lnSALES and ∆ lnVA. First two columns compare the results for the whole
sample, the last two represents the results for a subsample of companies from manufac-
turing sectors only. In order to have comparable samples, when ∆ lnSALES is used, the
sample is reduced only to those companies for which ∆ lnVA is available.
sample all sectors manufacture
dependent variable ∆ lnVA ∆lnSALES ∆lnVA ∆lnSALES
const 0.086*** 0.200*** 0.043 0.062**
(0.031) (0.052) (0.039) (0.029)
∆ lnFA 0.078*** 0.047** 0.033 0.010
(0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
∆ lnSC 0.387*** 0.613*** 0.446*** 0.598***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.049) (0.046)
Horizontal 0.180* 0.107 0.115 0.146
(0.105) (0.128) (0.124) (0.104)
Backward 0.151 -0.374 0.210 0.032
(0.333) (0.356) (0.441) (0.421)
Forward -0.306 -0.503 -0.141 0.313
(0.525) (0.526) (0.718) (0.623)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 7 559 7 549 3 221 3 219
F statistic 33.340 37.102 30.378 51.748
Note: Regressions with firms’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
they have been corrected for clustering for each sector-year; significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Foreign Ownership and
Corporate Performance: The
Czech Republic at EU Entry
(Joint work with Sˇteˇpa´n Jurajda)
(CERGE-EI Working Paper #389)
3.1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is likely to be one of the key channels of eco-
nomic development for middle-income countries, particularly so for the post-
communist economies of Central Europe (e.g., Alfaro et al., 2004; Neuhaus,
2006). Foreign-owned companies, a group that includes both greenfields
and foreign acquisitions, are consistently more productive than domestically
owned firms, as Sabirianova et al. (2005) demonstrate for the Czech Re-
public and Russia.1 Taking the productivity advantage of FDI as a given, a
large literature therefore studies its indirect impacts on domestic companies
– productivity spillovers within and across industries (e.g., Javorcik, 2004).
However, there is less work available measuring the direct causal productivity
effects of foreign takeovers of domestic companies, even though such measure-
ments are important for evaluating the benefits of greenfield vs. brownfield
1For theory of and empirical tests supporting the productivity dominance of foreign-
owned firms, see Helpman et al. (2004) and, e.g., Girma et al. (2004).
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FDI support and for understanding the nature of FDI flows.
There is, of course, a large literature studying the effects of early-transition
privatization of state-owned companies in post-communist economies. In one
of the most complete analysis, Brown et al. (2006) suggest that privatizing
state-owned companies to foreign entities during the 1990s generated larger
productivity gains than privatization to domestic owners. In several transi-
tion economies, however, large FDI inflows started only after the mass pri-
vatization programs were completed. The Czech Republic is a case in point
as it received a massive inflow of foreign capital only after 1997.2
In this paper, we therefore provide evidence on FDI’s recent direct ef-
fects: We assess the effects of over three hundred cases of foreign takeovers
observed in a sample of Czech firms between 1997 and 2005. Unlike most
of the work on privatization or, indeed, on foreign takeovers, we analyze not
only manufacturing companies, but also the service sector, where the share of
foreign capital as of 2005 was about 40% of that in manufacturing industries.3
We contrast the takeover effects across not only the services/manufacturing
divide, but also across the groups of exporting and non-exporting manufac-
turing industries as these are likely to differ in terms of the strategies that
multinationals use when entering a given sector. While acquiring a domestic
company in a non-exporting sector eliminates a potential domestic competi-
tor, acquiring a local company in an internationally competitive industry is
more likely to be motivated mainly by high domestic-company performance
and may therefore lead to smaller takeover productivity improvements.4
Further, we follow Brown et al. (2009) in studying not only the productiv-
ity effects of ownership changes, but also the effects on workers. Specifically,
we ask whether foreign takeovers affect the wage bill of the company, i.e., the
total earnings of employees. The question of interest to workers as well as
2Benefiting from investment subsidies and tax breaks introduced in 1997, Czech FDI
inflows rose from below 3% of GDP in 1996 to 1997 to over 10% during 1999 to 2002. As
a result, Czech FDI stock per capita reached 5,256 EUR in 2005, the end of our sample
frame, which compares favorably with the 2005 FDI stock in Slovakia (2,721) or Poland
(2,070).
3Out of over ten studies of foreign ownership effects in the Czech Republic during the
1990s, the only one to cover the service sector is Kosova´ (2009), who focuses on the indirect
effects of FDI. Outside of Central Europe, only Aitken and Harrison (1999) work with non-
manufacturing data. The related literature is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
4There is a growing theoretical literature on how firms choose modes of foreign market
access, but little empirical work on the topic; see, e.g., Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for a
general equilibrium model with heterogenous firms.
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policy makers is whether scale effects of takeovers outweigh the cost-cutting
potentially associated with the higher productivity foreign owners impose
on their acquisitions and, therefore, whether foreign acquisitions ultimately
benefit the employees of domestic companies.
A fundamental problem with the identification of these causal effects is
that multinational companies are likely to select the best domestic firms
as acquisition targets. In the absence of credible instrumental variables,
most studies attempt to achieve progress on causality by conditioning on pre-
takeover performance. An increasingly popular technique, see, e.g., Arnold
and Javorcik (2005) or Girma et al. (2007), is to match foreign acquisitions
to domestic firms with similar probability of being acquired by multination-
als and to compare the before/after performance changes between the two
groups. As argued by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), this approach com-
bines careful conditioning on observables through matching on pre-takeover
performance (trends) with before/after differencing that eliminates time-
constant unobservables. We follow their suggestion and apply the matched
difference-in-differences approach to our sample of Czech manufacturing and
service firms, effectively comparing the change in performance of companies
taken over by foreign investors between the moment of acquisition and one to
three years later with the corresponding change in performance of matched
domestic companies.
Using several performance indicators, we find the impact of foreign in-
vestors on domestic acquisitions to vary across types of target industries.
Based on data covering the experience of Czech firms around the moment
of the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU, we uncover significant effects of
foreign takeovers only in the non-exporting manufacturing sector, consistent
with the argument that firms in exporting manufacturing industries success-
fully face direct international competition and do not need to be ‘disciplined’
by foreign owners.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section covers the existing
work on takeover effects and ownership change, with a focus on results avail-
able for the Czech Republic. Our empirical strategy and data are described
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively, while Section 3.5 presents the findings.
The last section concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
There are numerous studies estimating the direct effects foreign investors
have on the performance of domestic companies during the early-transition
mass-privatization period (see, e.g., Djankov and Murrell, 2002, for a survey;
or Estrin et al., 2009). In this section, we first highlight those that focus on
the Czech Republic and then briefly discuss groups of studies of ownership
effects that differ in their preferred estimation technique.
A small literature estimates positive effects of foreign ownership on to-
tal factor productivity (TFP), or its growth, in the Czech Republic using
data from 1992 to 1998 covering the mass privatization (e.g., Djankov and
Hoekman, 2000; Jarol´ım, 2000; Damijan et al., 2003; Evenett and Voicu,
2003). These studies typically use small samples of manufacturing or pub-
licly traded firms to estimate linear regressions with exogeneity in foreign
status (or sample selection corrections)5 based on various arguments, includ-
ing the exclusion of the firm’s initial efficiency or the relative size of the given
firm within its industry from the company performance regression. In the
most detailed and careful study of the Czech mass-privatization experience
to-date, Hanousek et al. (2007) instrument for ownership changes using pre-
market initial conditions and detect positive effects of foreign ownership on
various performance measures driven mainly by foreign industrial firms.6
The research on Czech firms undergoing mass privatization is typical of
most of the existing work on ownership effects from other countries in that it
relies on panel-data techniques and postulates exclusion restrictions that al-
low for instrumental variable (IV) strategies.7 Some of this work combines the
IV approach with fixed-effects estimation conditioning on lagged dependent
variable and requires the (weak) exogeneity of lagged outcome and control
5Variables affecting ownership status but unrelated to company performance (including
potential future performance in absence of a takeover) can be used to either instrument
for a foreign-ownership dummy in a pooled regression or to identify sample selection cor-
rections in a switching-regression framework.
6Several recent papers also ask about the indirect effects of FDI on domestic Czech
companies through productivity spillovers within and across industries (see, e.g., Kosova´,
2009, or Stancˇ´ık, 2007). The key identification problem of this literature, similar to the
need for exogenous determinants of foreign ownership in the work on FDI’s direct effects,
is to identify variation in industry FDI inflow that is not driven by (estimates of) future
growth of that industry.
7Only the early studies in this area did not attempt to account for the endogeneity
(“cherry picking”) of foreign ownership, e.g., Aitken and Harrison (1999) for Venezuela.
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variables (e.g., Benratello and Sembenelli, 2006). The identification of such
dynamic GMM models, however, is fragile when the variables of interest are
sufficiently persistent.
Convincing quasi-experiments affecting ownership but not performance
are seldom found, especially once the focus shifts beyond pre-market initial
conditions to late-transition data. Another strand of research thus attempts
to control for the correlation between ownership type and company unob-
servables in a simple static regression framework using company fixed effects
and/or time trends. A prime example of this body of work is provided by
the analysis of long panel data from four transition countries by Brown et
al. (2006), who suggest that privatizing state-owned companies to foreign
entities generates larger productivity gains than privatization to domestic
owners. The basic goal of these regressions is to compare the performance of
domestic and foreign-owned firms after conditioning on both time-constant
unobservables (captured by the firm fixed effects) and pre-takeover perfor-
mance change (captured by the firm-specific time trends). However, to the
extent that much of the data used in the estimation of these firm fixed ef-
fects and time trends comes from after the ownership change, these methods
may ‘over-control’ and lead to an under-estimation of the effect of interest.
Furthermore, regression-based techniques may suffer from the so-called lack
of ‘common support’ (Barsky et al., 2002) when the characteristics of firms
acquired by foreign investors differ from those of a significant share of firms
in the data that remain domestic.
An increasingly popular alternative conditioning technique is to match
foreign acquisitions to domestic firms with similar probability of being ac-
quired by multinationals based on pre-takeover performance and to compare
the before/after performance changes between the two groups. Examples of
this approach, which combines careful conditioning on observables through
propensity score matching on pre-takeover performance (possibly including
performance trends) with the before/after differencing that eliminates time-
constant unobservables, are the studies of Arnold and Javorcik (2005) and
Girma et al. (2007), who study Indonesian and UK manufacturing firms,
respectively, and uncover significant foreign-takeover TFP effects.
Finally, while there are several results available on the effects of foreign
takeovers on firm productivity, less attention has been paid to the effects on
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firm wage bill and employment, even though these two variables are impor-
tant from the perspective of political economy of FDI. Brown et al. (2009)
are the first to combine evidence on productivity effects with estimates of
wage and employment effects of ownership change of manufacturing firms of
four transition economies (but not the Czech Republic); they suggest that
foreign takeovers have scale-expansion effects that dominate the productivity-
improvement effects, leading to a positive effect on workers’ wages.
In this paper, we apply the matched difference-in-differences compari-
son to a sample of Czech manufacturing and service-sector firms from 1995-
2005. Unlike the existing analysis of the Czech Republic, or indeed of other
countries from Central Europe, we estimate the effects of foreign takeovers
that took place after 1997, i.e., after the mass privatization programs were
completed. Unlike almost all of the work on both transition and devel-
oping economies, we study the experience of not only manufacturing, but
also service-sector firms, and we differentiate between exporting and non-
exporting manufacturing industries. Finally, we also measure the conse-
quences of foreign acquisitions not only for company performance indicators,
but also for their wage bills – a variable more interesting for workers subject
to such an ownership change.
3.3 Estimation Approach
To circumvent the selection into foreign-owned status (“cherry picking” by
foreign investors), we draw on the microeconometric evaluation literature
and employ propensity-score matching to compare changes in performance
associated with foreign takeovers to changes in performance in highly similar
companies that remain domestic. Specifically, one can estimate the causal
effect of foreign ownership on a given outcome indicator by assuming that
the assignment to foreign-owned status is as good as random conditional on
observables summarized in the propensity score, i.e., within a group of firms
that share a similar predicted probability of being acquired by foreign in-
vestors P (Xt−1) ≡ P (FDIt = 1|Xt−1), where t corresponds to the timing
of the foreign acquisition. The outcome measure of interest in our case con-
sists of the difference between a company’s performance at the time of being
acquired and one to three years later, i.e., Yt+k − Yt, where k = 1, 2, 3.
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The causal effect of interest, an average effect of treatment on the treated,
is defined as the difference between the average outcome measure of firms that
were acquired by foreign investors, denoted E [Y1,t+k − Y1,t|FDIt = 1] , which
is easy to obtain from data, and the hypothetical counterfactual outcome of
these same firms had they not been acquired: E [Y0,t+k − Y0,t|FDIt = 1]. The
counterfactual is estimated based on the conditional independence assump-
tion (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) as the average outcome of firms that were
not acquired by foreign investors, but that had the same probability of being
acquired as of time t – the same value of the propensity score:
E [Y0,t+k − Y0,t|FDIt = 1, P (Xt−1)] = E [Y0,t+k − Y0,t | FDIt = 0, P (Xt−1)] .
(3.1)
The probability of being acquired (the propensity score) is assumed to depend
on a set of time-changing observable characteristics, chiefly firm-level balance-
sheet indicators, entered both contemporaneously and lagged to capture pre-
takeover performance trends; the exercise is performed within groups defined
by (matching is ‘exact’ on) year and industry.8 Equation (3.1) implies that
a basic requirement for the implementation of the matching approach is a
sufficiently large overlap between the distribution of the propensity score of
the acquired and the domestic companies (the common support condition).9
3.4 Data
The company-level balance-sheet annual data used in this study come from
the ASPEKT commercial database, which is a Czech source for the Amadeus
EU-wide data and is widely used in empirical research (e.g., Hanousek et al.,
2007; Hanousek et al., 2009). Crucially, the ASPEKT data provide infor-
mation on companies’ ownership structure and, thus, allow one to identify
foreign-owned companies. We interpret a company as foreign-owned if it has
8The procedure is implemented using Mahalanobis-metric matching with replacement
in the latest version of the psmatch2 Stata routine provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
9An assessment of the matching quality consists of checking whether the matching
procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables across the control and
treatment group. To this effect, we perform two-sample t-tests as suggested by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985).
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at least 10% of its equity owned by a foreign investor.10
The purpose of the study is to contrast the performance of domestic firms
that were acquired by foreign investors to that of firms that remain domestic-
owned. We therefore disregard information on foreign-owned greenfields in
most of the analysis.11 After dropping observations with inconsistent finan-
cial information, firms with fixed assets of less than 1 million CZK (approx-
imately 30, 000 EUR), as well as industrial branches involving a strong reg-
ulatory role of the government,12 the resulting sample contains information
on 4, 049 companies from forty 2-digit NACE industrial sectors and covers
the 1995-2005 period, generating 26, 163 firm-year observations.13
An overview of the year-ownership and industry-ownership structure of
the sample is provided in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. In a typical year,
there are over two thousand companies in the data. We observe 324 cases
of foreign takeovers and foreign-owned data represent almost 6% of all firm-
year observations. The timing of foreign acquisitions mimics the time series of
aggregate FDI inflow as recorded by the Czech National Bank (CNB), rising
swiftly after 1997.14 Table 3.3 shows that in some industries, as many as 20%
of firms in our sample were acquired by foreign investors during the sample
frame, while there are no foreign takeovers in several 2-digit industries. The
share of foreign capital in each industry, which reflects both foreign takeovers
and greenfields, also varies widely from low levels in, e.g., the leather or hotel
10This threshold is used also in the official definition of FDI by the Czech National Bank
and in studies of firm-level data by Evenett and Voicu (2003), Damijan et al. (2003), or
Javorcik (2004). The average share of a foreign investor in a Czech company in our data
is 3.0%.
11Greenfields were preliminarily identified as firms newly appearing in the sample with
(near) 100% foreign ownership; all such cases were then checked manually (information on
these firms was found on the Internet) to confirm that the observed firm is in fact not an
acquisition of a previously domestically owned company.
12Agriculture, forestry, fishing, utilities, public administration, health and education;
NACE codes 1, 2, 5, 41, 75, 80, and 85.
13We also observe 1, 018 unique greenfields with foreign ownership in our sample, 5, 743
firm-year observations in total. Including the greenfields, our panel data thus have 31, 906
observations.
14To check for potential attrition bias related to ownership, we compared the exit rates
of ‘always-domestic’ and ‘after-takeover’ firms and found it nearly identical in all years.
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and restaurant industries, to 0.8 in insurance and pension funding.15
We list 2-digit NACE industries in three groups: services, exporting, and
non-exporting manufacturing.16 An industry is considered to be ‘exporting’
if it exports at least 50% of its production on average over the period 1995-
2005.17 The average share of foreign-owned assets in our three groups of
industries ranges from 13% in the service sector to 38% in the exporting
manufacturing industries. Similarly, the share of foreign capital in a given
industry in acquisitions (as opposed to greenfields) is the lowest in the service
sector. Most foreign investors in services apparently build greenfields, which
may reflect the relatively low Czech share of employment in the service sector
in an EU comparison.
Table 3.4 provides summary statistics of all firm-level variables used in
the estimation. Balance-sheet information is used to form four corporate
performance indicators: ratios of profit over total assets; debt over total
assets; a simple measure of total factor productivity (residuals from industry-
specific regressions of firm value added on fixed assets and staff costs); and
the company wage bill (unfortunately, employment is not available).
The Table provides descriptive statistics not only for the sample we work
with, but also for the matched sub-sample of firms where the ‘treatment’ and
‘control’ firms used are only those that could be matched to their counterparts
based on the estimated propensity score within industry and year cells.18
Clearly, matching sheds almost half of the data, suggesting that the common
support problem is a relevant concern in these data. In particular, several of
the service-sector industries are lost from the matching comparison including
15To check the representativeness of the ASPEKT data with respect to foreign owner-
ship, we compare the official FDI figures (from the CNB) listed in the third column of
Table 3.3 to estimates of the share of foreign fixed assets based on our sample (calculated
by summing up the capital of both foreign acquisitions and greenfields). The correlation
between the two measures across 2-digit NACE industries, weighted by the share of fixed
assets of each industry covered by the sample, is 0.96.
16A small group of ‘other industries’ is also included in the data when we analyze all
industries.
17The output and export statistics were obtained from the OECD. We have alternatively
defined exporting manufacturing industries using only the 1995-1997 time window, which
led to the re-classification of four 2-digit NACE categories from the ‘exporting’ to the ‘non-
exporting’ group; this change, however, had no material effect on the estimated effects of
foreign acquisition reported in the next section.
18The propensity score controls for profits over total assets as well as for other firm-level
variables, see Table 3.5 for details.
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telecommunications and computer services.19
Before estimating the causal effects of foreign ownership, we provide one
last descriptive comparison. Specifically, we ask whether foreign-owned firms
out-perform domestic-owned ones on average within years and industries.
We answer this descriptive question by running a simple OLS regression
with our panel data (including greenfields), where we condition on year and
2-digit NACE industry dummies as well as three ownership indicators: a
dummy that equals 1 during the two years before an entry of foreign eq-
uity into a domestic company; a dummy that equals 1 for all years after
the foreign acquisition; and a separate dummy for foreign-owned greenfields;
domestic-owned companies are the base group. Using such simple compar-
isons, and additionally controlling for the logarithm of firm staff costs, we
find that greenfields have statistically significantly higher level of profits over
total assets (by 0.06) compared to domestic-owned companies, while the dif-
ferences between domestic-owned company-year observations and those for
firms (about to be) acquired by foreign investors are not statistically dis-
cernible. Using the wage bill as the dependent variable, and replacing firm
staff costs with firm fixed assets in the conditioning set, we find that all
three foreign-ownership dummy coefficients are positive and statistically sig-
nificant, ranging from 0.20 for foreign acquisitions to 0.35 for greenfields.
Similarly, using TFP as the dependent variable, and conditioning only on
year and industry dummies, we find that all three foreign-ownership dummy
coefficients are positive and statistically significant, ranging from 0.07 for do-
mestic firms about to be acquired by foreign investors to 0.24 for greenfields.
In short, foreign ownership is associated with higher productivity, profits, or
wages of Czech companies.
19Matching also effectively excludes observations with extreme values of profits over
total assets. Dropping those observations manually (i.e., those that exceed 0.15 in absolute
value) does not lead to sizeable changes in the estimated coefficients. Similarly for liabilities
over total assets (with the exclusion threshold at 2).
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Propensity Score Estimation
Our first task is to estimate the propensity score – the probability that an
individual firm with certain characteristics is acquired by a foreign entity in
a given year. Such analysis is interesting in its own (descriptive) right, and
it also provides the key continuous conditioning variable for the matching
exercise. A set of logit specifications for the probability of foreign takeover
is reported in Table 3.5. The propensity score is predicted based on com-
pany age and either fixed assets or staff costs (depending on the outcome
performance measure: profit or liabilities over assets, TFP, and wages); each
specification then additionally controls for the level of the outcome variable
from one and two years prior to the current year, which is meant to control
for trends in performance prior to takeover.
Older firms are more likely to be acquired as are larger firms and those
with higher staff costs. A positive trend in profitability and a negative trend
in liability (conditional on other controls) appear to predict the chances of a
foreign takeover, while higher lagged TFP level is associated with a higher
probability of foreign equity entering a given firm.20 The results are thus
consistent with foreign investors “cherry picking” domestic firms. There ap-
pears to be little relationship between company wage bills (conditional on
firm size) and the takeover chances. These propensity scores are used in the
difference-in-differences with matching estimation in the next section.21
Table 3.6 presents an auxiliary set of logit specifications controlling for
profit over total assets, where we additionally condition on the share of for-
20The estimated propensity score coefficients are not materially affected when we add
2-digit industry and year dummies, i.e., the variables on which we match ‘exactly’.
21To assess how well the propensity score performed in balancing observables across the
matched treatment and controls, we performed two-sample t-tests suggested by Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1985) and evaluated pseudo R2 statistics before and after matching.
There were no systematic differences in the distribution of covariates after matching and
the pseudo-R2 was close to zero (0.01, down from 0.06 before matching). Similar conclu-
sions come from F-tests on the joint significance of all regressors. However, one may be
concerned that since the share of domestic companies in our sample is shrinking over time
(from 88% to 65%), the quality of the match could be deteriorating over time as well.
For this reason, we performed a series of t-tests using subsamples based on 4-year moving
windows of the data. The evolution of the pseudo-R2 values measured after matching
does suggest some deterioration in match quality over time with a threefold rise over the
sample frame, but the values generally stay under 0.1.
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eign greenfields and takeovers in the given industry and year. These spec-
ifications are meant to shed some light on the industry-specific strategies
that foreign investors follow when entering a given market. Estimation is
performed on the full sample as well as on sub-samples of companies that
operate in non-exporting manufacturing industries, exporting manufacturing
industries, and in the service sector. The magnitude of the coefficients is
broadly similar across the three industry groups, although we find the posi-
tive effect of Takeover share to be statistically significant only in the service
sector. While there is no relationship between the presence of greenfields and
the decision of a foreign investor to acquire a domestic firm, there appears
to be strong industry-level consistency in the location of takeovers. For ex-
ample in the service sector, ‘moving’ from the lowest to the highest observed
industry Takeover share (from 0 to 0.06) increases the probability of another
takeover by about two percentage points.
Table 3.6 also shows that the importance of the pre-acquisition trend in
profits over assets is mainly coming from the service sector and, possibly
quantitatively more importantly even if not statistically significantly, from
the exporting manufacturing industries. On the other hand, there appears
to be little “cherry picking” in the non-exporting sector, consistent with the
notion that company performance may be less important for the acquisition
decision in this sector.
3.5.2 Foreign-Ownership Effects
In this section, we report the results of the matched difference-in-differences
analysis of the performance change gap between domestic and foreign com-
panies one to three years after acquisition. Tables 3.7 to 3.10 report the re-
sults for the four performance indicators we study. In all four cases, we find
that foreign ownership leads to substantial improvements in corporate perfor-
mance indicators of firms in the non-exporting manufacturing industries, with
typically the strongest impact two years after the foreign takeover,22 while
22Girma et al. (2007) uncover a similar time pattern in their study of foreign ownership
effects.
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no significant effects are estimated for the remaining two industry groups.23
The magnitude of the estimated effects in the non-exporting industries is
economically significant too. For example, the two-year change in profits over
assets (liabilities per total assets) driven by a foreign acquisition corresponds
to about one-tenth (twentieth) of the all-sample standard deviation of all ob-
served two-year changes in this variable. Focusing on the TFP performance
measure and using the estimate from three years after the foreign acquisition,
the effect corresponds to about one-quarter of the all-sample standard devia-
tion in these three-year changes. Finally, the impact of a foreign acquisition
on the change in the (log) wage bill, and therefore on the workers subject
to foreign takeover, is certainly economically significant at the 25 percentage
points of the wage bill growth rate above the domestically owned firms two
years after the acquisition. The timing of the onset of these effects in the
non-exporting manufacturing industries, with profits rising early on, wage
bills throughout and TFP only in year t+ 3, is consistent with the presence
of some short-term (“low-hanging”) profit opportunities implemented after
takeover such as the sale of non-core assets. Our results for total factor
productivity and wage bills are in line with those from Arnold and Javorcik
(2005), although their estimated effects of foreign acquisitions in Indonesia
are substantially larger in magnitude.
We have performed a number of robustness checks that signalled little
sensitivity of these conclusions to sample choices or to details of the esti-
mation technique. Among other checks, we have tried dropping the last
year of the sample (2005), where there is somewhat less data, and we also
experimented with using only industries where the sample coverage of the
firm population was above the 30th percentile of the industry distribution
of coverage. Instead of following the performance indicators for each year
after the acquisition separately, we additionally re-estimated the matching
exercises whilst focusing on 2-year and 3-year moving average windows of
performance, and we also assessed the sensitivity to defining exporting in-
dustries using 1995-1997 data instead of the whole sample period.
23The one exception to this statement is the large negative wage-bill effects estimated
for both exporting manufacturing and service industries three years after foreign takeover.
However, these estimates are based on the lowest number of matched ‘treatment’ compa-
nies of all of the estimated specifications, and we thus hesitate to draw strong conclusions.
Perhaps the scope for scale effects is limited in these industries.
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Most importantly, we have estimated the foreign-acquisition effects based
on an alternative grouping of manufacturing industries. Instead of divid-
ing the industries based on strong exporting performance, we have divided
manufacturing industries based on their openness to international compe-
tition defined as share of import plus export on the aggregate import and
export from a given year. We then divided industries into low/medium/high
openness using the 33rd and 66th percentiles of the industry distribution
of openness. Similar to our main set of findings, we uncovered significant
foreign-acquisition effects only in the low-openness group of industries, while
the size of the estimated treatment effects was broadly consistent with those
reported in the main set of findings.
3.6 Conclusion
There is a large literature studying the effects of ownership changes during
early-transition privatization, but much less work on the effects of recent
FDI, which is, arguably, the more important ‘engine of growth’ in post-
communist countries. Furthermore, most of the FDI-related research focuses
on its indirect effect, such that we know comparatively little about the direct
effect of foreign takeovers on domestic companies and the choices of mode of
foreign-market access (greenfield vs. brownfield) that foreign investors make.
Based on data covering the experience of Czech companies around the
time of the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU and using the matched
difference-in-differences approach, we find that foreign takeovers significantly
boost several corporate performance indicators in non-exporting manufactur-
ing industries, but have little effect in other industries. Workers of these firms
benefit from the acquisitions as well, at least in terms of their wages. These
findings are consistent with the argument that firms in exporting manufac-
turing industries face direct international competition and do not need to be
‘disciplined’ by foreign owners.24 Our study complements the results of Alfaro
(2003), who in a cross-country study of FDI effects, finds that manufacturing
FDI generates a positive growth effect, while the impact is ambiguous in the
24In a related analysis, Konings et al. (2003) suggest that exposure to international
trade and competition is one of the key driving forces of the restructuring of Ukrainian
firms during 1998-2000.
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service sector.25 The absence of a statistically or economically significant ef-
fect of takeovers on service-sector firms may be driven by market regulation
or structure and motivates future work on service-sector FDI.
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3.8 Appendix
Table 3.1: Definition of Industry-Level FDI Variables.
FDI share Foreign direct investment divided by fixed assets at the 2-digit
NACE industry level. (Source: Czech National Bank.)
FDI share by takeovers Industry-level fixed assets of domestic companies acquired by
foreign investors divided by industry fixed assets. (Source: Aspekt.)
FDI share by greenfields Industry-level fixed assets of foreign companies built by foreign
investors divided by industry fixed assets. (Source: Aspekt.)
Takeover share Product of industry FDI share and FDI share by takeovers.
Greenfield share Product of industry FDI share and FDI share by greenfields.
Table 3.2: Number of Companies by Year.
The column ‘always domestic’ gives the number of companies observed in a given year
that remain domestic throughout the sample frame; the column ‘before acquisition’ gives
the number of domestic companies observed in a given year that are to be acquired by a
foreign entity later; the column ‘after acquisition’ gives the number of observed companies
that are foreign-owned as of a given year; the column ‘N’ gives the total number of firm
observations in the sample, which contains no greenfields. The last column ‘acquisitions’
gives the number of foreign acquisitions in a given year.
firm-year observations
year always domestic before acquisition after acquisition N acquisitions
1995 1,841 244 0 2,085 0
1996 2,093 262 5 2,360 5
1997 2,236 210 64 2,510 57
1998 2,275 192 94 2,561 32
1999 2,302 162 126 2,590 36
2000 2,271 126 163 2,560 47
2001 2,242 81 199 2,522 51
2002 2,230 56 211 2,497 31
2003 2,159 31 221 2,411 29
2004 1,984 10 220 2,214 23
2005 1,638 0 215 1,853 13
Total 23,271 1,374 1,518 26,163 324
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Table 3.3: FDI Share and Structure by Industry as of 2005.
The column ‘N’ gives the number of companies in the sample observed at least once, while
the second column shows the (cumulative) share of these companies taken over by foreign
entities. The third column presents the official FDI share on industry fixed assets as of
2005 and the last one shows the share of FDI capital in companies acquired by foreign
investors (as opposed to built by them). See Table 3.1 for variable definitions. A sector
is considered to be export oriented if it exports at least 50% of its production abroad on
average over the 1995-2005 period.
NACE Share of FDI share Takeover share
N takeovers on FDI
Non-exporting manufacturing
15 Food products and beverages 327 0.09 0.23 0.03
20 Wood and wood products 154 0.08 0.19 0.02
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 29 0.14 0.51 0.02
22 Publishing and printing 162 0.12 0.23 0.01
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 14 0.21 0.28 0.07
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 161 0.08 0.38 0.01
27 Basic metals 99 0.12 0.29 0.01
28 Fabricated metal products 461 0.10 0.22 0.01
Total 1,407 0.10 0.28 0.03
Exporting manufacturing
17 Textiles 95 0.09 0.17 0.02
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 22 0.00 0.08 0.00
19 Leather and leather products 25 0.08 0.03 0.00
24 Chemicals and chemical products 139 0.12 0.31 0.03
25 Rubber and plastic products 68 0.15 0.41 0.01
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 119 0.13 0.28 0.06
30 Office machinery and computers 22 0.09 0.50 0.02
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 86 0.05 0.44 0.04
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 38 0.08 0.65 0.01
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 49 0.06 0.42 0.01
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 15 0.20 0.57 0.44
35 Other transport equipment 13 0.08 0.13 0.04
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 27 0.07 0.12 0.01
37 Recycling 36 0.03 0.17 0.03
Total 754 0.10 0.38 0.04
Services
50 Sale and repair of motor vehicles 140 0.06 0.14 0.01
51 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles 663 0.06 0.32 0.01
52 Retail trade; repair of personal goods 290 0.05 0.27 0.03
55 Hotels and restaurants 49 0.04 0.06 0.01
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 22 0.09 0.08 0.00
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 10 0.00 0.01 0.00
64 Post and telecommunications 9 0.11 0.52 0.05
65 Financial intermediation 152 0.08 0.73 0.06
66 Insurance and pension funding 26 0.15 0.80 0.06
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 32 0.13 0.38 0.05
70 Real estate services 65 0.09 0.03 0.00
72 Computer and related services 15 0.07 0.38 0.01
73 Research and development 8 0.00 0.02 0.00
74 Other business services 51 0.12 0.35 0.02
Total 1,532 0.07 0.13 0.01
Other industries
10 Mining of coal and lignite 19 0.00 0.01 0.00
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 4 0.00 0.05 0.00
14 Other mining and quarrying 57 0.11 0.34 0.02
45 Construction 276 0.08 0.10 0.00
Total 356 0.08 0.08 0.01
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Table 3.5: P-score Estimation.
The table presents the marginal effects from Logit estimation asking whether a domestic
company becomes foreign-owned.
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
lnSC t−1 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002)
lnFAt−1 0.014***
(0.003)
PROFIT/TAt−1 0.004
(0.004)
PROFIT/TAt−2 -0.005**
(0.002)
LIAB/TAt−1 -0.004
(0.006)
LIAB/TAt−2 0.0002***
(0.0000)
lnWAGES t−1 -0.009
(0.010)
lnWAGES t−2 0.015
(0.010)
lnTFP t−1 0.005
(0.004)
lnTFP t−2 0.011***
(0.004)
N 17,274 17,268 12,149 16,194
χ2 188.132 192.442 125.229 141.553
pseudoR2 0.065 0.065 0.076 0.045
Note: Age stands for years since company incorporation, FA stands for company fixed
assets, SC is staff costs, TA is total assets, WAGES is wage bill, PROFIT stands for
profit/loss, LIAB denotes company liabilities, and TFP denotes company total factor
productivity. All financial variables are in thousands of CZK. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses; they have been corrected for clustering at company level. Significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 3.6: P-score Estimation with Foreign Shares included.
The table presents the marginal effects from Logit estimation asking whether a domestic
company becomes foreign-owned.
All Manufacturing Services
industries Nonexporting Exporting
Age 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Age2 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002* -0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
lnSC t−1 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
PROFIT/TAt−1 0.004 -0.012 0.010 0.003
(0.004) (0.014) (0.008) (0.003)
PROFIT/TAt−2 -0.004** -0.007 -0.010 -0.004**
(0.002) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002)
Takeover share 0.223** 0.426 0.219 0.293**
(0.101) (0.344) (0.143) (0.119)
Greenfield share 0.047 -0.003 0.056 0.066
(0.039) (0.080) (0.054) (0.059)
N 17274 7299 3820 4748
χ2 201.831 99.703 37.660 64.732
pseudoR2 0.068 0.076 0.059 0.076
Note: Age stands for years since company incorporation, SC is staff costs, TA is total
assets, and PROFIT stands for profit/loss. See Table 3.1 for definitions of ‘Takeover
share’ and ‘Greenfield share’. A sector is considered to be export oriented if it exports
at least 50% of its production abroad on average over the 1995-2005 period. All financial
variables are in thousands of CZK. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; they have
been corrected for clustering at company level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Matching Results – Profit per Total Assets.
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over by
foreign investors between the moment of acquisition and one to three years later with the
corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Table 3.3 for
industry grouping. The performance measure is profit over total assets (PROFIT/TA).
All Manufacturing Services
industries Nonexporting Exporting
t+ 1 0.038 0.061* 0.019 -0.008
(0.026) (0.034) (0.035) (0.027)
N treated matched 206 101 46 41
N controls matched 12,760 5,469 2,844 3,416
t+ 2 0.191* 0.141*** 0.017 0.004
(0.099) (0.045) (0.029) (0.138)
N treated matched 172 84 40 33
N controls matched 10,075 4,383 2,282 2,609
t+ 3 -0.057 -0.082 -0.002 -0.006
(0.044) (0.121) (0.044) (0.038)
N treated matched 144 68 38 25
N controls matched 7,766 3,421 1,788 1,954
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected for
clustering at company level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Matching Results – Liabilities per Total Assets.
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over by
foreign investors between the moment of acquisition and one to three years later with the
corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Table 3.3 for
industry grouping. The performance measure is liabilities over total assets (LIAB/TA).
All Manufacturing Services
industries Nonexporting Exporting
t+ 1 -0.008 -0.035 0.019 0.004
(0.048) (0.342) (0.133) (0.049)
N 12,984 5,579 2,898 3,457
N treated matched 207 99 47 43
N controls matched 12,751 5,469 2,843 3,410
t+ 2 -0.332 -0.672** -0.019 0.009
(0.360) (0.297) (0.254) (0.077)
N 10,267 4,476 2,331 2,642
N treated matched 172 85 42 36
N controls matched 10,067 4,382 2,281 2,604
t+ 3 -0.327** -0.357** 0.038 -0.080
(0.134) (0.171) (0.111) (0.108)
N 7,928 3,499 1,832 1,980
N treated matched 143 69 38 24
N controls matched 7,759 3,420 1,787 1,950
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected for
clustering at company level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Matching Results – Wage Bill.
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over
by foreign investors between the moment of acquisition and one to three years later with
the corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Table 3.3
for industry grouping. The performance measure variable is the logarithm of the company
wage bill (lnWAGES ).
All Manufacturing Services
industries Nonexporting Exporting
t+ 1 0.069* 0.169** -0.085 0.158
(0.041) (0.070) (0.071) (0.178)
N 9,182 4,276 2,165 2,116
N treated matched 134 71 34 24
N controls matched 9,021 4,193 2,126 2,086
t+ 2 0.114 0.254** -0.115 -0.150
(0.073) (0.101) (0.109) (0.265)
N 7,295 3,438 1,749 1,626
N treated matched 115 60 30 18
N controls matched 7,155 3,366 1,713 1,601
t+ 3 0.013 0.401** -0.326** -0.747**
(0.083) (0.192) (0.155) (0.341)
N 5,655 2,698 1,379 1,219
N treated matched 90 50 28 12
N controls matched 5,534 2,638 1,345 1,198
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected for
clustering at company level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Matching Results – Total Factor Productivity.
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over by
foreign investors between the moment of acquisition and one to three years later with the
corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Table 3.3 for
industry grouping. The performance measure is the logarithm of total factor productivity
(lnTFP); see Table 3.4 for the definition of TFP.
All Manufacturing Services
industries Nonexporting Exporting
t+ 1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.037 -0.143
(0.035) (0.050) (0.049) (0.156)
N 12,209 5,401 2,796 3,039
N treated matched 205 104 44 34
N controls matched 11,991 5,292 2,746 2,999
t+ 2 0.021 0.034 -0.052 -0.160
(0.038) (0.078) (0.131) (0.201)
N 9,635 4,315 2,239 2,327
N treated matched 176 85 40 28
N controls matched 9,447 4,224 2,191 2,295
t+ 3 0.166** 0.183*** -0.007 -0.085
(0.082) (0.071) (0.134) (0.129)
N 7,418 3,357 1,756 1,738
N treated matched 147 73 34 23
N controls matched 7,261 3,281 1,714 1,714
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected for
clustering at company level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
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